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Youth in the juvenile justice system experience racially disparate outcomes at all contact 
points throughout the system process, despite race-neutral state policies governing the juvenile 
justice system. States provide defense counsel for indigent youth in the juvenile justice system 
through policies containing race-neutral language; however, each state maintains different 
policies protecting youth rights to defense counsel. This study questions the relationships among 
state policies protecting youth rights to defense counsel, racially disparate outcomes for youth in 
the juvenile justice system, and state socioeconomic and racial composition. The study relies on 
content analysis to transform qualitative state policies into quantitative data suitable for 
quantitative analysis. As identified through statistical analysis, the study results indicate some 
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The juvenile justice system has a long-standing history of disparately impacting youth of 
lower-socioeconomic status and minority racial/ethnic groups. In recent decades, research and 
policies have focused on the disproportionate manner in which the juvenile justice system 
processes and punishes non-White youth at all decision-making points. The disparate outcomes 
for non-White youth indicate potential racial disparity in the implementation of policies 
governing the juvenile justice system. These policies appear race-neutral on their face but result 
in disparate outcomes. Acknowledging racial disparity in the juvenile justice system, the federal 
government initially approached the topic in the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act 
through a core mandate that requires states to address disproportionate minority confinement. 
This core mandate has since expanded to address disproportionate minority contact, recognizing 
the problem extends beyond confinement (Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention 
2009; 42 U.S.C. 5602 (2002)). 
Policies structuring the juvenile justice system mandate most legal decision-making 
authority to the prosecutor, judge, and the defendant through defense counsel representation. In 
the adversarial juvenile delinquency court, which also seeks to rehabilitate youth, the prosecutor 
represents the state and the need to maintain public safety, while the defense attorney upholds the 
rights of the defendant. The defense attorney bears a significant role in the juvenile justice 
system, and this role may contain opportunities to mitigate racially disparate outcomes.  
Defense attorneys in juvenile court protect youth’s due process rights and provide a 
check on the state’s police, prosecutorial, and correctional power, thus ensuring individual 
liberties do not fall victim to unyielding state power.  Defense counsel has the opportunity to 
review and challenge decisions made by the state throughout the process, from arrest to 
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placement in secure confinement.  The ability to review prior justice-system decisions and 
advocate for future decisions allows defense attorneys to uphold youth due process rights and 
monitor state discretionary power.  
Access to the protections of defense counsel differs for youth based on geographical and 
socioeconomic factors. Research indicates that indigent youth have restricted access to quality 
defense counsel in juvenile delinquency courts due to local practices and policies that limit, or 
lack explicit direction on, the waiver, appointment, retention, and role of defense attorneys 
provided to indigent youth. Although these defense-related policies appear race-neutral, they 
may have a disparate impact on groups of racially and ethnically non-White youth because these 
youths enter the juvenile justice system at high rates. As a result, a systemic lack of defense 
counsel representation for youth in delinquency courts systematically reduces the due process 
protections for youth, contributing to racial and ethnic disparity.  
The juvenile justice system has a history of operating under policies written in race-
neutral language but impacting youth in a racially and ethnically disparate manner. Historically, 
the juvenile justice system has developed through policies that appear race-neutral based on their 
text, but when implemented have a disparate impact on youth of lower-socioeconomic status, 
immigrant youth, and youth from non-White racial/ethnic groups (Platt, 1969; Ward, 2012; 
Alexander, 2012). The development of juvenile justice system policies that appear neutral to 
societal differences, but systematically create disparate outcomes for groups of youth labeled 
“other” by society, follow the trajectory established during modernity with the rise of the state. 
This trajectory encompasses the manner in which the groups in power – the landowning Whites 
– create and use the concept of race to maintain power and control over those who seemingly 
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threaten homogeneity; this conceptualization and form of control manifests in laws that appear 
race neutral but have racially-disparate impacts (see Goldberg, 2002; Platt, 1969; Ward, 2012). 
Critical theorists highlight the rise of the juvenile justice system in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s as a mechanism of formal social control specifically for youth from lower 
socioeconomic and immigrant families (Platt, 1969). The juvenile justice system excluded Black 
youth for many decades, punishing them with the convict-lease system or in adult criminal courts 
(Ward, 2012). With the rise of the civil rights era in the 1960s, Black youth entered into the 
juvenile justice system at disproportionately high rates, receiving disproportionately severe 
sentences (Ward, 2012). As this trend continues in juvenile and criminal justice systems, critical 
theorists emphasize the use of the justice systems to maintain power over non-White groups 
(Alexander, 2012).  
Defense counsel maintains an important check on the power of the state exercised 
throughout the justice systems as a mechanism to ensure state power does not usurp individual 
liberties. Research on indigent juvenile defense indicates a systemic lack of quality counsel for 
youth of lower socioeconomic status, who cannot afford counsel and are often of a non-White 
race/ethnicity (in particular Black, Latino, Native American, and Southeast Asian) due to the 
high rates of non-White youth processed by the juvenile justice system (National Juvenile 
Defender Center 2012; Feld 2010; see Haywood Burns Institute). Studies further explicate this 
finding through the identification of limitations to indigent juvenile defense practices. These 
include, but are not limited to, late appointment of counsel, role confusion, waiver of counsel, 
presumption of indigence, post-disposition/appeal representation, and limitations of review for 
transfer to adult court (National Juvenile Defender Center 2012; Puritz et al. 1995). Although 
these limitations occur across the United States, states vary with regard to the statutory provision 
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of indigent defense counsel. Some state laws encompass some or all of the specific defense 
provisions; while other states provide only broad legislation on the right to defense counsel in 
delinquency court.  
Statutes, court rules, and case law regarding defense counsel maintains race-neutral 
language, but these legal policies disparately impact non-White and lower socioeconomic status 
youth (see National Juvenile Defender Center 2012; National Juvenile Defender Center 2012b; 
Haywood Burns Institute; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2009). As a 
result, statutory provisions for defense counsel become important mechanisms for prohibiting 
overarching state power that may contribute to an unjust use of the juvenile justice system as a 
mechanism of maintaining the status quo of the power structure. This pattern – the use of laws 
that seem race-neutral on their face but have a disparate impact and maintain the power 
structures in society – appears in several areas of law and throughout criminal justice. Prior 
studies find significant relationships between an increase in the presence of racially/ethnically 
non-White groups in a community and formal social control of non-White and lower 
socioeconomic groups; the criminal justice system serves as the mechanism to administer the 
forms of social control – such as increased police resources, more arrests, and harsher sentences. 
 This study connects the prior research findings to determine whether the seemingly race-
neutral laws on the provision of defense counsel in delinquency court have a significant 
association with the socioeconomic and racial composition of a state. More specifically, this 
study questions whether the policies providing defense counsel promote or restrict due process 
protection for youth in relationship to the demographic composition of the state. The general 
guiding research question for the study asks: Do states with larger proportions of lower 
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socioeconomic and non-White persons have policies that limit access to and the role of defense 
counsel in the juvenile justice system? 
 The study relies on qualitative and quantitative data to answer the research questions. 
Qualitative state statutes, court rules, and case law inform the researcher of common trends in the 
provision of juvenile defense counsel in across the United States. A content analysis process 
determines a quantitative score for each state regarding is policy protections for defense counsel 
representation and subsequently youth due process protections. Using U.S. census data on race, 
ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, quantitative analysis determines whether statistically 
significant relationships among the percent of non-White and lower socioeconomic groups in 
each state, the disparate outcomes, and the state laws governing provision of due process to 
youth in delinquency courts.  
 This study seeks to assist researchers and policy-makers in addressing disproportionate 
minority contact in state juvenile delinquency courts through protections for defense counsel 
representation. It also seeks to contribute to policy conversation regarding the disproportionate 
minority contact core provision of the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act. While 
disparate outcomes for youth in the juvenile justice system presents a complex and multi-
systemic problem, understanding the role of defense counsel in mitigating racially disparate 
outcomes at a systemic level may contribute to a decrease in disproportionate minority contact 







Theoretical Framework: Due Process, Race, and the State 
 
This study derives from critical race theory, which identifies the role of the State in 
maintaining the power of a racially hegemonic society through laws that facially appear race-
neutral but have a negative disparate impact on minority races. Scholars have tracked this 
maintenance of hegemonic power at the expense of a racially heterogenic minority to the rise of 
modernity, beginning in the 1500s. The concepts of race and disparate outcomes for non-Whites 
that emerged during modernity parallel the racial disparities in the present criminal and juvenile 
justice system. The laws governing the juvenile justice system appear racially-neutral; however, 
non-White youth experience disparate outcomes at every contact point of the juvenile justice 
system.  
 Using the framework identified by David Theo Goldberg (2002), and supported by other 
critical race theory scholars, this study examines “The Racial State” framework in relationship to 
juvenile justice. As asserted by some scholars, the juvenile justice system can function as a social 
control mechanism for youth of lower socioeconomic status and non-White youth (Platt, 1969; 
Ward, 2012), with defense counsel policies as a protection for youth against overreaching state 
power. Although the defense counsel policies appear race-neutral on their face, they have a 
disparate impact on non-White youth due to high rates of disproportionate minority contact 
across the juvenile justice system. These policies can protect the due process rights of youth or 
limit the protection of due process rights, depending on the access to representation these 
policies grant. The disparate rate of non-White youth in the juvenile justice system means 
juvenile defense policies have a disparate impact on non-White youth. The Racial State 
theoretical framework – supported by the application of critical theory to the impact of the 
juvenile justice system on youth of lower socioeconomic status prior to 1970, and the application 
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of critical race theory to the impact of the juvenile justice system on Black youth – forms the 
foundation for exploring the relationship among population demographics, disparate non-White 
youth contact with the juvenile justice system, and defense counsel policies.  
Defense counsel policies uphold the youth’s Constitutional right to due process through 
the 14th Amendment. The United States Constitution provides due process to restrain unyielding 
state power to take away individual and group liberties. Critical theorists recognize that state 
power tends to maintain the current power structures in place and leans towards populous 
homogeneity rather than heterogeneity. With the rise of the modern state in the fifteenth century, 
this tendency emerges for the first time as the creation of the concept of race and the 
reinforcement of structural dominance over non-Whites, by the Whites who held society’s power 
(Goldberg 2002; Essed and Goldberg, 2002). The power structures of the modern State, 
specifically the United States, reflect the modern State conceptualizations of race and 
maintenance of current power structures.  
 
The Racial State, Colorblind Rhetoric, and “Race-Neutral” Laws 
 
The concept of racism and the “othering” of people based on race developed with rise of 
modernity. As transportation and communication developed with the breakdown of feudalism, 
the rise of the modern state brought with it a fear of power loss and high value placed on 
homogeneity beginning in the fifteenth century (Goldberg, 2002). Race became a concept to 
define others and a mechanism for crisis management and containment of threats to homogeneity 
(Goldberg, 2002). Scholar David Theo Goldberg (2002) traces two primary lines of race-based 
thought through the rise of modernity: naturalism and historicism. Naturalism characterizes 
people of non-White races as “others” who have a biological difference that justify exclusion, 
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enslavement, and extortion (Goldberg, 2002). Historicism relies on a portrayal of non-White 
races as culturally immature (Goldberg, 2002).  
As noted by Goldberg, the predominate philosophers during the rise of modernity – 
Hobbes and Locke – reflect the perceptions of naturalism and historicism in their writings. 
Hobbes frames race as a conception of a natural, native condition incapable of developmental or 
historical progress (Goldberg, 2002 citing Hobbes 1651/1968). The “State of Nature” fixes racial 
characteristics inherent to groups of people, justifying the rise of the modern state ruled by the 
rational capability of Europeans (and colonizers) who progressed beyond an original natural state 
(Goldberg, 2002). Locke presents an agency-based argument for the modern state dominance 
over people of non-White races (Goldberg, 2002 citing Locke1689/1960). Locke asserts non-
White races as capable of, but also dismissive of, organizing themselves into a productive nation-
state (Goldberg, 2002 citing Locke1689/1960). Framed as having the agency to reject nation-
state organization, the enslavement of non-Whites becomes a colonized outcome of a “just war” 
(Goldberg 2002). Building on the philosophies of Hobbes and Locke, Kant furthers the exclusion 
of non-Whites from the nation-state by explicitly stating that citizens of the state must be “their 
own masters,” excluding those who are not White, male, property owners (Goldberg, 2002 citing 
Kant 1775/1950). These philosophers demonstrate the societal creation of race as a method of 
excluding groups of people from the rights and protections of the nation-state (Goldberg, 2002). 
The law deriving from the rise of modernity contains the naturalist and historicist 
frameworks. Naturalist thought lineage creates laws repressing groups by race, and historicist 
thought lineage produces laws governing groups by race (Goldberg, 2002). Most often lacking 
explicitly language referencing race, laws appear neutral at face value but have the effect of 
disparately repressing groups by race and promoting group interests of Whites (Goldberg, 2002; 
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Alexander, 2012; see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 1938). The modern state operates 
through the creation and enforcement of laws, and scholars assert that capitalist states focus on 
laws governing three areas of society, all of which govern race at their core: 1) migration and 
immigration, 2) social interaction and 3) crime control (Goldberg, 2002: 102). Through law, the 
state establishes institutions and governs social relations, which reflect racial conceptions, 
exclusions, and forms of repression (Goldberg, 2002). State regulations surrounding 
“criminalization, taxation, retirement, death, burial, and inheritance formalities” shape societal 
advantages and disadvantages through the silent routinization of race (Goldberg, 2002: 117).   
Michelle Alexander (2012) further speaks to the impact of criminal justice laws silent on 
race but disparately impacting people of racial and ethnic groups. Alexander chronicles US 
policies from the founding of the United States through the present day that present race-neutral 
language but allow for oppression, discrimination, and formal social control of non-White 
people. Beginning with the Constitution, which does not use race-based language but allowed for 
the institution of slavery; through Jim Crow Era policies written in race-neutral language but 
allowed for racially discriminatory practices; to the current era of mass incarceration in the 
United States, Alexander demonstrates how U.S. policies attempt to preserve the power 
structures in the US established by property-owning White men through race-neutral language 
(Alexander, 2012). Alexander argues that race-neutral and “colorblind” language reduces the 
ability of citizens to recognize the disparate racial impact of laws and to advocate for change 
(Alexander, 2012).  
The modern state generally, and the United States specifically, most often articulates its 
laws in race-neutral, abstract language; however, lack of reference to race serves to deprive 
people of rights and privileges silently (Goldberg, 2002). Legal language of the modern state 
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asserts rational positivism that generalizes and abstracts law (Goldberg, 2002; Essed and 
Goldberg, 2002). The generalizations and abstractions create the appearance of neutrality, 
uniformity, and systematic application of the law, regardless of the conditions or status of 
individuals and groups (Goldberg, 2002). Promoting the constitution of society as hegemonic 
(the modern state’s ideal) law’s “impartiality help[s] to paper over deep contrasts and divisions 
across space, place, people, and classes” (Goldberg, 2002: 140). The abstraction of law codes 
and race-neutral language create a legal environment in which “colorblindness” distracts from 
acknowledging the racially disparate impact of the justice system (Goldberg, 2002; Essed and 
Goldberg, 2002; Alexander 2012).   
The race-neutral language of law hides law’s support and continuance of the power 
structure imposed through the “othering” of non-White groups in the promotion of hegemony in 
the modern state. Further, the racially neutral language justifies law’s disparate impact according 
to race (Goldberg, 2002; Essed and Goldberg, 2002). Unexposed in legal language, racial 
exclusion from rights and power becomes an unaddressed and unrecognized vehicle for 
“structurally marking opportunities and access, patterns of income and wealth, privilege and 
relative power” (Essed and Goldberg, 2002: 4). The conceptualization and definition of race that 
arose with the creation of the modern state permeates the modern legal system, unexposed by 
race-neutral language, perpetuating an idolization of hegemony and the power structure 
supporting Whites (Goldberg, 2002).  
 The juvenile justice system generally, and the provision of defense counsel specifically, 
demonstrate the racially disparate outcomes as a result of race-neutral statutes, court rules, and 
case law language. As representatives for the state and public safety, police and prosecutors 
arrest and charge youth in the juvenile justice system under the dual premise of rehabilitation and 
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accountability.  Defense counsel in juvenile court upholds the due process rights of youth and 
advocates to the judge the expressed interest of the youth during the court process. Due process 
rights provide a limit to state power by requiring the state to meet its legal burdens and maintain 
Recognizing state power as perpetuating status quo hegemony and power structure, due process 




The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states no State shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, §1). Due process has come to encompass both procedural due process and substantive due 
process. In American jurisprudence, it serves as a cornerstone for justice in civil, criminal, and 
administrative areas of law. Procedural due process dictates the necessity of actions/steps the 
government must follow before limiting the rights and freedoms of an individual or group. 
Prescribing the series of actions/steps the government must follow limits the ability of the state 
to make unjust or arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process 
increases the likeliness of a fair outcome and, in some instances, becomes a method of 
establishing justice in and of itself (Rawls 1971).  
While the juvenile justice system maintains the goal of rehabilitation, youth face harsh 
consequences and deprivations of liberty when adjudicated delinquent. The harsh consequences 
and deprivations of liberty prompted the Supreme Court to provide youth the right to defense 
counsel through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. This provision differs from the 
adult Constitutional right to defense counsel in criminal court through the Sixth Amendment and 
Gideon v. Wainwright. The U.S. Supreme Court maintains that delinquency court differs in its 
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foundational doctrine and goals of rehabilitation from adult criminal court; however, youth still 
require due process protections in the form of counsel, even without the application of the Sixth 
Amendment to delinquency court (In re Gault, 1967). 
While the U.S. Supreme Court established the right to defense counsel, state legislatures 
have the autonomy to pass state-specific laws regarding the provision of defense counsel. As a 
result, state codes, regulatory laws, and case law differ in the provision of defense counsel for 
youth. Some states explicitly identify the procedural contact point for the appointment of 
counsel, the presumption of indigence for the defendant, the role of counsel, and the length of 
representation. Other states provide a general, non-specific right to counsel. Although courts and 
attorneys may extend representation beyond the minimums provided by state statute, stark state 
policies may restrict uniform access to defense counsel. 
As examples from two states, and as presented by the National Juvenile Defender Center 
database,1  
“In Nevada, youth in juvenile court have the right to counsel “at all stages of the 
proceedings” and “the court shall advise the child and the parent or guardian of the child” 
of this right. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62D.030(1). The summons served with a petition shall 
include notice “of the child of the child’s right to be represented by an attorney at the 
initial hearing.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62C.300(1)(b).”  
 
“In Connecticut, youth in juvenile court have the right to counsel: 
● Upon a determination of indigence and before a juvenile’s first appearance in court 
on a delinquency matter, a public defender must be authorized to represent a 
juvenile, until the court appoints counsel. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(d). 
● At the commencement at any proceeding concerning the alleged delinquency of a 
child…the child shall have the right to counsel and be so informed by the judge, 
and if the child and parents are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be 
provided for them. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-135(A). 
● “Whenever a request for a competency examination is under consideration by the 
court, the child or youth shall be represented by counsel in accordance with the 
provisions of sections 46b-135 and 46b-136.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-128a(b).” 
  
                                                 
1 Retrieved from: http://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/ 
 
13 
As protectors of youth due process rights in delinquency court, restricted access to 
defense counsel thereby limits the due process protections for youth (National Juvenile Defender 
Center, 2012). Defense counsel maintains the responsibility of ensuring the state meets its 
burdens of proof in establishing guilt without violating the Constitutional rights of the youth. 
Defense counsel appointed at early contact of the youth with the juvenile justice system may 
advise the youth of his or her rights throughout the process, including protecting youth rights 
during contact with police, courts, and corrections. Restrictions on the appointment of counsel, 
resulting from the silence of state policies on juvenile defense counsel, risk depriving youth of 
due process protections (Puritz et al., 1995). 
 State statutes, regulatory codes, case law, court rules, and non-regulatory guidelines on 
defense counsel in delinquency court appear race-neutral on their face. Although these policies 
may not directly operate through race-based decisions, the juvenile justice system provides a 
mechanism for social control by the state over groups perceived to threaten the status quo of 
those who hold the power in society and the desire to maintain a homogeneous society. As 
detailed below, the provision of due process through juvenile defense attorneys limits and 
reviews state power and discretionary or arbitrary decision-making. The policies that govern the 
provision of defense counsel have a significant impact on the access youth in delinquency court 
have to defense counsel, and as a result, these policies shape the availability of due process 
protections for youth, most of whom are from non-White racial/ethnic groups and lower of lower 
socioeconomic status. 
 
Defense Counsel: Protectors of Due Process in the Juvenile Justice System 
 
The traditional view of the juvenile court establishes that the began in the late 1800s to 
provide rehabilitation for youth who engaged in delinquent behavior (Feld and Bishop 2011; 
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Platt 1969). Throughout the years, juvenile delinquency court has maintained the language of 
rehabilitating youth and balancing the best interests of youth with public safety of the 
community. Although criticism of the juvenile delinquency court demonstrates the use of the 
delinquency court as a formal social control mechanism for youth in non-White racial/ethnic and 
lower socioeconomic groups, most state juvenile justice codes cite rehabilitation as the central 
purpose of the juvenile justice system (Platt 1969; Ward 2012). Until the late 1960s, US 
delinquency court lacked an adversarial system and due process protections, based on the (later-
established faulty) perceptions that due process contradicts rehabilitation and youth did not 
experience significant deprivations of liberty when adjudicated delinquent.  
In the late 1960s, immediately following the “Warren Court Due Process Revolution,” 
the United States Supreme Court granted youth in delinquency due process protections through 
the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Puritz, 1995). In addition to finding expansive 
criminal procedure protections for defendants (Brady v. Maryland, Mapp v. Ohio, Miranda v. 
Arizona, Escobedo v. Illinois, Gideon v. Wainwright, Katz v. United States, Terry v. Ohio), the 
US Supreme Court granted youth due process protections in three court cases, Kent (1966), 
Gault (1967), and Winship (1970). These three Supreme Court cases established the requirement 
of due process in delinquency court and in transfers to adult court, despite the parens patriae 
doctrine guiding the juvenile justice system. The due process requirements established the right 
to defense counsel, notification of charges, cross examination of witnesses, right against self 
incrimination, and the burden of proof for the state as beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile 
delinquency courts (Kent v. United States 1966; In re Gault 1967; In re Winship 1970). 
In Kent, the court granted youth in delinquency court the right to full investigative 
inquiry, reasoning the “social welfare philosophy of the juvenile court “is not an invitation to 
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procedural arbitrariness” (Kent v. United States, 1966). Kent serves as a foundation for the right 
to counsel in Gault by discussing the need for counsel during waiver to adult court and need for 
procedural protections despite the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court. The language of the 
Kent decision set the precedent for the Gault decision to determine that youth had a right to due 
process base on the authority of juvenile delinquency courts to deprive youth of liberty through 
harsh punishments (Kent v. United States, 1966).  
In the 1960s, the United State Supreme Court recognized the failure of the juvenile court 
to uphold the rehabilitative ideal and noted the punitive nature of the juvenile court. The Warren 
Court and Court opinions that immediately followed highlighted the prevalence of wrongful 
convictions, judicial arbitrariness, discriminatory decisions, and general abuses of power in 
juvenile courts (Markman 2007; Feld and Bishop 2011). In response, the Court instituted 
procedural safeguards for youth in juvenile court, which established an adversarial procedural 
framework for juvenile court. Central to the procedural safeguards, the US Supreme Court 
upheld a juvenile’s right to a defense attorney in the 1967 case, In re Gault.  
In the Gault case, the police arrested and detained fifteen-year-old Jerry Gault for making 
lewd telephone calls to a teacher. The police did not notify Gault’s parents and did not serve 
Gault or his parents with a petition. The juvenile court hearing did not include any procedural 
safeguards, such as the creation of a record, and the juvenile court relied on conflicting evidence 
to sentence Gault to six years in a juvenile detention hall. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found the right to procedural safeguards, specifically the right to defense counsel, in the Due 
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court cited the increasing similarities 
between juvenile court and adult court, specifically the deprivation of liberty that results from a 
juvenile disposition and the punitive nature of the juvenile court, as reasons for invoking the Due 
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Process Clause of the 14th Amendment (In re Gault, 1967). In the discussion of the right to 
counsel, the Court raises concerns regarding the lack of voice the child has in the proceedings 
when a child does not have defense counsel, clarifies the roles of the judge and the probation 
officer as not being representatives for the interests of the child (creating a unique and separate 
representative role of defense counsel), and asserts the need for defense representation of the 
child at all stages of the proceeding. The Court states,  
“A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 
‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness 
to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with 
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the 
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The 
child ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him” 
(In re Gault, 1967 ).  
 
In re Gault establishes the legal framework and precedent for juvenile representation by defense 
counsel in all juvenile delinquency courts. 
         National standards for juvenile representation further explicate the role of juvenile 
defense counsel to uphold due process rights for youth in delinquency court as established by 
Gault. The Institute of Judicial Administration-American Bar Association, the National Advisory 
Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the National Council of Juvenile 
and Family Court Judges, and the National Juvenile Defender Center promulgated standards and 
guidelines for juvenile defense in accordance with In re Gault, professional responsibility 
standards for the practice of law, and professional consensus in the duties counsel owes juvenile 
defendants (National Juvenile Defender Center, 2009). These standards require juveniles to 
receive representation at all stages of the court process, and the standards reflect or explicitly 
state the role of defense counsel to represent the expressed interests of youth. The National 
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Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges states the responsibility of the juvenile defense 
attorney to  
“[a]ppear as an attorney for the youth in all hearings concerning a juvenile 
accused of an act where the defense attorney would appear if an adult committed the 
same act. This includes, but is not limited to, hearings for detention, speedy trial, 
motions, dismissal, entry of pleas, trial, waiver, disposition, post-disposition reviews, 
probation or parole violation hearings, and any appeal from or collateral attacks upon the 
decisions in each of these proceedings” (National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges, 2005: 30).  
 
Most specifically, in its Standards for Juvenile Justice, the Institute of Judicial Administration-
American Bar Association states, “In general, determination of the client's interests in the 
proceedings, and hence the plea to be entered, is ultimately the responsibility of the client after 
full consultation with the attorney. […] Counsel for the respondent in a delinquency or in need of 
supervision proceeding should ordinarily be bound by the client's definition of his or her interests 
with respect to admission or denial of the facts or conditions alleged” (Institute of Judicial 
Administration-American Bar Association, 1979: 17). Similarly, the National Juvenile Defense 
Standards promulgated by the National Juvenile Defender Center state, “Counsel’s primary and 
fundamental responsibility is to advocate for the client’s expressed interest” (National Juvenile 
Defender Center, 2012b: 19). The multiple national standards promulgated in the decades after 
the Gault decision reflect the Supreme Court’s holding that juveniles have a due process right to 
counsel in the same manner adults have a Constitutional right to counsel in criminal court. 
Despite the Constitutional right to defense counsel and the national standards, defense counsel 
policies still differ greatly from state to state.  
This study presents an inquiry into the application of The Racial State theoretical 
framework in juvenile justice. Race began as a creation of the modern state as enlightenment, 
innovation, and government structures emerged in the fifteenth century. The creation of race 
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served to maintain the homogeneity and power structure of landowning Whites. Critical theorists 
establish this power structure permeates the criminal and juvenile justice systems in the United 
States. Criminal and juvenile justice policies that use race-neutral language, but have a disparate 
impact based on race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, contribute to the maintenance of the 
current power structure in society. Juvenile defense attorneys restrict the power of the state to 
deprive youth of liberties by protecting the due process rights of youth, thereby potentially 
limiting the disparate impact on non-White youth in the juvenile justice system. Prior research 
establishes the validity of a racially disparate juvenile justice system; due process protections, 
upheld by defense counsel, as a guard against overarching state power to deprive liberty; and the 
differences in defense counsel policies across states. This study extends the prior research further 







Prior research on the role of state power through formal social control, including the 
criminal justice system, indicates a relationship between an increase in non-White racial/ethnic 
groups and an increase in formal social control by the state. This prior research forms the 
foundation of the project’s inquiry into the relationship between the presence of non-White and 
lower socioeconomic groups and the provision of defense counsel in juvenile delinquency court. 
Prior studies and assessments on juvenile defense portrays a lack of access to defense counsel for 
youth in delinquency court. As a protectors of due process rights, which serve to limit excessive 
State power to deprive individuals and groups liberty, access to defense counsel becomes critical 
in limiting disparate social control by the state over non-White and lower socioeconomic youth. 
Cumulatively, these fields of research inform and guide the inquiry in this study.   
  
Empirical Findings on the Relationships Among State Power, Community Demographics, 
and “Race-Neutral” Laws 
 
Prior research supports the theoretical connection between the disparate impact of 
seemingly race-neutral laws and the maintenance of White power structures in society. Many of 
these studies take a quantitative approach to demonstrate the increase of social control by the 
state that correlates with an increase in the rate of non-White populations within specific 
jurisdictions (Chamlin, 1989; Jackson, 1989; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Bontrager, Bales, & 
Chiricos, 2005; and Kautt, 2002). The studies also find the increase in formal social control by 
the state has a disparate impact on non-White groups (Chamlin, 1989; Jackson, 1989; Stults & 
Baumer, 2007; Bontrager, Bales, & Chiricos, 2005; and Kautt, 2002). This established 
association appears in several societal institutions.  While many of the studies measure formal 
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social control of the state through the impact on citizens – such as arrest, conviction, and 
incarceration rates – some studies measure formal social control through state-level legislation 
(Behrens et al. 2003; Brown-Dean, 2003). Both types of measures for formal social control 
establish a statistically significant relationship between higher levels of formal social control 
through state power and higher rates of non-White populations in communities. 
Research on the association between high population rates of non-White groups and 
formal social control often find an increase in non-White population rates corresponds with 
higher levels of formal social control. Researchers found criminal justice policies, and the 
manner in which officials implement policies, in the areas of policing, courts, and corrections 
have a more restrictive and punitive impact in locations with higher rates of non-White 
populations. While non-White populations engage in offending behaviors with the same or lesser 
frequency as White populations, the increase in formal social control still correlates with the 
increase in non-White population rates (Chamlin, 1989; Jackson, 1989; Stults & Baumer, 2007; 
Bontrager, Bales, & Chiricos, 2005; and Kautt, 2002; Behrens et al., 2003). Often theoretically 
framed as a prejudiced fear of non-White groups, research identifies a perceived threat to the 
status of the existing social arrangements, which grants Whites power and privilege, that 
correlates with the increase in formal social control (Blalock 1967; Hawkins 1987).  
Studies examining “minority group threat” theory identify associations between large 
rates of non-White populations and differences in criminal justice policies, procedural 
implementation of the policies, and public opinions related to criminal justice (Blalock, 1967; 
Hawkins, 1987). Research findings indicate increase in police mobilization, arrests, and use of 
deadly force correlate with higher percentages of non-White populations (Stults & Baumer, 
2007; Chamlin, 1989). Criminal justice expenditures, collateral sanctions, and legislated felony 
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disenfranchisement, as forms of formal social control, also correlate with higher percentages of 
non-White groups in a geographical location (Stults & Baumer, 2007; Behrens et al., 2003). 
Public attitudes and opinions follow the same trends as the findings on criminal justice policies 
and practices (Bontranger et al., 2005). Individuals who live in areas with higher rates of non-
White groups perceive crime rates as higher, indicate more support for capital punishment, and 
hold more punitive attitudes than areas with lower rates of non-White groups (Bontranger et al., 
2005).  
The findings vary in their findings of whether the mere presence of non-White groups in 
one geographical location, the influx of racial diversity, or the boundary lines of non-White 
groups in close proximity to Whites, results in the correlation between non-White groups and an 
increase in formal social control through the criminal justice system (Blalock 1967; Hawkins 
1987). Studies also indicate a co-variation occurs between economic conditions and racial 
diversity as influences on an increase in formal social control (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971). 
Spending allocations for police forces, police force size, and the harshness and length of adult 
sentencing outcomes correlate with the demographic characteristics of the geographic 
jurisdiction (Chamlin, 1989; Jackson, 1989; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Bontrager, Bales, & 
Chiricos, 2005; and Kautt, 2002).   
Following the trends established with studies on the adult criminal justice system, 
research on racial threat and juvenile court outcomes indicate a relationship between race and 
disparate outcomes for youth (Leiber et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2013; Kempf-Leonard, 2007; 
Leiber and Mack, 2003; Bridges et al., 1995). Research has looked at detention, diversion, 
petition, adjudication, and disposition for youth and found growing support in recent decades for 
disparate outcomes at each of those contact points during the juvenile court process.  The studies, 
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however, conceptualize race as an independent variable comprised of the race of each child in 
the study, rather than exploring the relationship between general population characteristics of the 
community in relationship to the racially disparate impact of the court process on youth (Leiber 
et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2013; Kempf-Leonard, 2007; Leiber and Mack, 2003; Bridges et al., 
1995).  
 
Empirical Findings on Access to Quality Juvenile Defense 
 
Qualitative and quantitative studies on juvenile justice, and more specifically juvenile 
defense, highlight discrepancies in the availability of defense counsel to youth in juvenile 
delinquency court. Based on local practices guided by state laws, access to quality defense 
counsel differs by location, courtroom, and youth defendant. Predominately, youth in juvenile 
delinquency court require the appointment of defense counsel by the state-based indigence 
qualifications. Although all youth in the United States have the right to defense counsel, the 
appointment, quality, and practices of counsel vary greatly.  
Studies on juvenile defense counsel and delinquency court establish a pattern of 
limitations to quality defense counsel for youth. While every state provides youth the right to 
defense counsel through state statutes (National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012b), youth still 
have restrictions on due process rights due to lack of access to defense counsel and limits on 
defense counsel advocacy regarding transfers to adult court. Limitations on defense counsel 
advocacy result from lack of access to quality defense counsel due to waiver, role confusion, 
limited duration of representation, and indigence determinations. 
 As discussed below, peer-reviewed research and general assessments on access to quality 
defense counsel results in similar findings. Generally, researchers note that the mere presence of 
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a defense attorney in juvenile delinquency court does not adequately result in quality 
representation for youth. Further, the findings demonstrate widespread differences in defense 
counsel practices and judicial practices that create large disparities in the quality of defense 
representation youth receive within single states. While many of the peer-reviewed studies 
inquire into the relationship between the presence of defense attorneys and dispositional results 
in delinquency court, they discuss, at length, the lack of quality defense counsel as a likely 
reason for some of the disparate findings (Feld, 1989; Berkheiser, 2002; Feld, 2010).  
Research that emerged after the Gault decision in the mid 1970s and early 1980s relied 
on limited methodological designs and used similar independent and dependent variables, 
resulting in consistent findings: defense counsel in juvenile court correlates with a harsher 
disposition (Stapleton and Teitelbaum, 1972; Ferster and Courtless, 1972; Clarke and Koch, 
1980). These studies rely on the presence of defense counsel in court as the independent variable 
and the dispositional outcomes as the dependent variable, conceptualizing the impact of the 
defense counsel as measured solely by dispositional outcome (Stapleton and Teitelbaum, 1972; 
Ferster and Courtless, 1972; Clarke and Koch, 1980). 
The more recent peer-reviewed research on juvenile defense counsel follows a similar 
research design to the initial studies emerging after In re Gault. These studies conceptualize 
defense counsel as having an attorney present in juvenile court to represent the youth at any point 
during the proceeding, rather than continuous representation throughout all stages of the 
proceeding (Feld, 1989; Burruss and Kempf-Leonard, 2002; Armstrong and Kim, 2011). 
Research focuses on statistics depicting general appointment of counsel, waiver of counsel, and 
the rate of representation based on the harshness of the offenses. In the studies that look at the 
impact of juvenile defense counsel, the researchers identify the presence of defense counsel as 
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the independent variable and the harshness of the sentence resulting from adjudication as the 
dependent variable (Stapleton and Teitelbaum, 1972; Ferster and Courtless, 1972; Clarke and 
Koch, 1980; Feld, 1989; Burruss and Kempf-Leonard, 2002; Armstrong and Kim, 2011). The 
studies identify barriers to accessing quality defense counsel, or depict the lack of counsel, 
without extensive discussion on the role of statutes, court rules, or case law on defense counsel 
(Clarke and Koch, 1980; Feld 1989; Burruss and Kempf-Leonard, 2002; Armstrong and Kim, 
2011).    
 The National Juvenile Defender Center, a resource and advocacy center for juvenile 
defense, has conducted 21 state assessments of juvenile access to quality defense counsel in the 
US. These assessments entail the collection and analysis of qualitative, quantitative, and legal 
research to determine the barriers to quality defense counsel in each state. The assessments 
completed by NJDC and academic studies found the same trends across studies and across US 
states. These trends present five common themes, often overlooked by laws providing defense 
representation, that form barriers to quality juvenile defense representation: waiver, role 
confusion, timing and duration of counsel appointment, indigence determinations, and decisions 
on transfer to adult court lacking defense counsel review.  
 
Waiver of Defense Counsel  
 
Systemic barriers in the juvenile court diminish the ability of juvenile defense counsel to 
fulfill the role of adversarial advocate of a juvenile’s expressed interests. The lack of defense 
counsel representation for youth contributes limits the due process rights of youth. High rates of 
waiver of counsel creates a significant barrier to the ability of defense to maintain the adversarial 
system in the juvenile court. Studies show the high rate of waiver of counsel in juvenile court 
across the United States (Feld 1989; Foxhoven 2007; National Juvenile Defender Center 2010; 
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National Juvenile Defender Center 2012; Burrell 2012; National Juvenile Defender Center 
2013).  
Some states implement the adult waiver of counsel standard in delinquency court and 
only allow youth to waive counsel when the waiver is made “knowingly, intelligent and 
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances” (Feld 2003; Feld, 1989; National Juvenile 
Defender Center 2012b). This standard allows courts to uphold the vast majority of waivers of 
counsel by youth, despite debates regarding the capacity of youth to make a decision regarding 
the waiver of counsel (Feld, 2003). Waiver occurs for a variety of reasons –  
“parental reluctance to retain an attorney; inadequate or non-existent public-defender 
legal services in nonurban areas; a judicial encouragement of and readiness to find a 
waiver of the right to counsel in order to ease administrative burdens on the courts; 
cursory and misleading judicial advisories of rights that inadequately convey the 
importance of the right to counsel and suggest that the waiver litany is simply a 
meaningless technicality; a continuing judicial hostility to an advocacy role in traditional 
treatment-oriented courts; or a judicial predetermination of dispositions with non-
appointment of counsel where probation or non-incarceration is the anticipated outcome”  
 
– and becomes a fundamental challenge to the due process rights of youth in delinquency court 
(Feld, 1989: 1200). Without an attorney, youth face the court process and delinquency 
determination without formal pressure on the state to meet the required evidentiary burdens in 
specific cases, preserve elements of the case for appeal, or identify systematic issues supporting 
unyielding state power (see May and Timmons, 2014; National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012; 
Stevenson, 2015; Tonry, 2004). Waiver of defense attorneys allows the state to present its case to 
the judge without the adversarial process required as part of the due process rights for youth.  
 
 
Role Confusion  
 
Juvenile defense attorneys hold the role of advocating for the youth’s express interest and 
holding the State accountable for discretionary decisions made at times of arrest, fact-finding, 
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charging, and during the court process. The role of the defender creates the necessary adversarial 
environment in the courtroom to uphold the due process rights of the youth. This occurs through 
the representation of the youth expressed interests. The expressed interest standard of defense in 
delinquency court creates some tension with the overall goal of the juvenile justice system to 
rehabilitate youth. Further, the role of counsel to advocate for the best interests of the child in 
dependency (child welfare) matters results in additional confusion regarding the role of defense 
counsel in delinquency court. When defense attorneys do not advocate for the expressed interests 
of youth, the adversarial process and due process protections weaken. 
Many barriers to youth due process rights result directly from confusion on the role of 
defense counsel in juvenile delinquency court.  The state assessments reveal systemic issues such 
insufficient access to specialized training, lack of zealous legal advocacy (including an 
“overwhelming number” of pleas at first appearance, lack of probable cause hearings, lack of 
motions practice, lack of dispositional advocacy, and lack of post-dispositional advocacy), lack 
of meaningful contact with clients in pre-trial detention, lack of confidential spaces for attorney-
client conversations, lack of advocacy to combat unjust practices, and lack of awareness of 
collateral consequences (National Juvenile Defender Center 2013; National Juvenile Defender 
Center 2012b; National Juvenile Defender Center 2010). Many of these systemic issues result 
from the perception of court as a non-adversarial proceeding based on the rehabilitative goal of 
the juvenile justice system and the role of the child’s attorney in the child welfare system. 
Further, the perception of court as non-adversarial contributes to the systemic problems, creating 
a cycle in which the court fails to provide juveniles with defense counsel as envisioned in Gault. 
The role of guardian ad litems in dependency court and delinquency court further 
confounds the role of defense counsel as an expressed interests advocate within the framework of 
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a “best interests” court. In dependency court, the court determines whether it is in the best 
interest of the youth to come under the custody of the court rather than remain in the custody of 
his or her parents. The youth receive representation in these proceedings from counsel who often 
carry the title “guardian ad litem.” The guardian ad litem advocates to the court for his or her 
independent assessment of the best interests of the child. The role of counsel in dependency court 
differs substantially from the role of defense counsel in juvenile court but contributes to the role 
confusion by emphasizing a goal and advocacy standard of bests interests for the child (in 
contrast to the express-interests standard in delinquency court (Feld, 2003; Foxhoven, 2007; 
Burrell, 2012). 
The role of defense counsel in delinquency court as an advocate of expressed interests 
requires defense counsel to assume responsibilities that differ from counsel in dependency court. 
The defense attorney represents the expressed interests of the youth and can only do this by 
giving the client "meaningful opportunity to participate in his or her own defense" (National 
Juvenile Defender Center, 2012). This can only occur when the defense counsel engages with the 
youth, understands the charges from the youth's perspective, and enables the youth to 
communicate his or her desire regarding the trajectory of the defense argument. In part, engaged 
communication with the client requires explaining complex legal matters to the youth (National 
Juvenile Defender Center, 2012). This role of defense counsel differs greatly from the role of a 
guardian ad litem, who presents to the dependency court an independent assessment of what the 
court should rule in light of the best interests of the youth and does not have to engage the youth 
in directing a legal defense. 
Further complicating matters, occasionally youth in delinquency court have guardian ad 
litem representation and defense counsel representation in the same matter before the court 
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(National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012; National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012b; In re 
Austin M., 2012). Although in theory the appointment of two separate attorneys could contribute 
to a clearer understanding of the two types of representation, often having both types of counsel 
in the same courtroom creates more confusion (National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012; 
National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012b; In re Austin M., 2012). Despite the differences in 
roles and training requirements, court will sometimes ask a guardian ad litem to take on a 
defense role or act simultaneously as a guardian ad litem and as defense counsel. As noted in one 
assessment by the National Juvenile Defender Center and representative of situations that occur 
frequently in delinquency courts across the country,  
“The ways in which these roles are commingled and confounded in juvenile courts across 
Colorado was alarming. GALs were sometimes encouraged by judges to take on defender 
responsibilities alongside their duty to represent the child’s best interest. It was often the 
judge that would ask the GAL to “stand in” for a plea. One investigator observed twin 13 
year old brothers taking a plea to a sex offense and the Court asked a GAL to stand in and 
represent them for purposes of the plea. She did so. She had never met the boys nor 
talked to them before or during the proceeding. When the assessment team investigator 
asked the GAL afterwards who advised those twin brothers about the sex offender 
registry, the GAL simply stared blankly. Investigators often observed GALs merely 
obliging requests by the court to stand in as a substitute for defense counsel” (National 
Juvenile Defender Center, 2012: 37).  
 
In this example, the guardian ad litem failed to determine the express interests of the boys and 
did not assist them in directing a defense, understanding the process, or the considering the 
consequences of a plea, ultimately failing to fulfill the role of defense counsel. 
         An Illinois court case that came before the State Supreme Court demonstrates the impact 
role confusion of the guardian ad litem and defense counsel has on the due process rights of a 
youth and the impact role confusion has on other delinquency court actors (In re Austin M., 
2012). In this case, the Court found Austin M. did not receive “the type of counsel” guaranteed 
by due process and that found an inherent, per se conflict of interest when the defense attorney 
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acted as a guardian ad litem (In re Austin M., 2012). Further, in dicta, the Court acknowledges 
the role confusion that extended beyond the roles of defense counsel and guardian ad litem into 
the role of the prosecutor who defends the interest of the state (In re Austin M., 2012). 
To complicate matters further, academics and advocates have identified and interpreted 
ambiguity within the Gualt decision regarding the role of parents in delinquency court. The 
Gault decision does not clearly denote whether defense counsel should take the parents’ interests 
into consideration when advocating for the juvenile (see In re Gault, 1967). Although common 
interpretation of the decision focuses on the juvenile’s express interests over the interests of the 
parents, a lack of clear direction from the Court fails to recognize the “everyday” realities of 
juvenile court in which parents, who may have interests counter to the interests of the youth, 
assert authority over the child’s right defense counsel and to direct his or her own defense 
(Fedders, 2010). Often parents pressure or make the decision for youth to waive counsel or 
accept a plea negotiation. This pressure often derives from a perception of delinquency court as 
non-serious and a desire to conclude the matter as quickly as possible (Fedders, 2010). The 
acceptance of parent-directed decisions regarding waiver and plea-bargaining further undermines 
and confuses the role of defense counsel to advocate for the expressed interest of the youth in 
delinquency court. 
The rules of professional conduct enforced in each state dictate the role of counsel to 
advocate for expressed interest of the client, and in delinquency court, the client is the juvenile, 
thus requiring the advocacy for the expressed interest of the juvenile (National Juvenile Defender 
Center, 2012b.) Within the literature, no debate exists regarding any implication of the rules of 
professional conduct to advocate for the juvenile’s best interest. This lack of debate leads to the 
assumption that role confusion creates advocacy for the best interests of the youth rather than a 
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professional and ethical decision regarding best-interests advocacy in delinquency court 
((National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012b). Any debate surrounding the role of defense 
counsel to advocate for the expressed interests of the youth arises within a competency and 
diminished capacity of the client framework (Katner, 2007).  The rules of professional conduct 
require an attorney who represents a client with “diminished capacity” to take protective 
measures such as appointing a guardian ad litem (Katner, 2007). A client with diminished 
capacity does not have the ability to act in his or her own interest (Katner, 2007). Although 
significant debate exists regarding the capacity of youth to direct defense counsel and participate 
in his or her own defense, the standard in most states is the same as the adult standard, which 
requires a low level of capacity, enabling youth to meet the competency standard (Katner, 2007; 
Larson, 2011). The low-level standards for mental capacity and legal competence contributes to 
the removal of this issue from the “best interests versus expressed” interests debate.  Most courts 
find youth competent to stand trial, indicating youth have the competency to direct counsel to 
make an expressed interests argument to the court on behalf of the youth. 
          
Timing and Duration of Appointment of Counsel 
 
 Defense attorneys have the role and responsibility of protecting due process rights 
throughout the entire time period a youth has contact with the justice system (National Juvenile 
Justice Center, 2012b; US Department of Justice, 2015). This includes review of and advocacy 
during contact with the police, initial conversations with prosecutors, detention hearings, trial, 
appeals process, and post-adjudication placement (National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012b; 
Feld 2010). Appointment of counsel at initial contact with the juvenile justice system, with the 
duration of the appointment for the entire time a youth remains in the system, allows defense 
attorneys to protect youth rights throughout the entire process and preserve a record. Review of 
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police interrogation methods, prosecutorial plea offerings, conditions of confinement, and 
violations of probation becomes impossible without early and longstanding appointment of 
counsel (Feld, 2010; Berkheiser, 2003; Bookser, 2004; Puritz and Shang, 2000).  
Defense counsel representation throughout the entire process preserves the rights of the 
individual youth and provides greater opportunities to protect due process rights for all youth in 
the juvenile justice system. Defense attorneys have the unique position to review, at a systemic 
level, injustice occurring within police, court, and corrections policies and practices. Defenders 
may raise observations of justice violations through individual court advocacy, policy 
recommendations, and the appeals process. Early appointment allows the defense attorney to 
advise during a plea bargain and bring a case to trial, creating a record for future review. 
Continued representation enables the defender to appeal on behalf of the individual youth and to 
improve the laws governing juvenile justice. Researchers assert that limitations to the 
appointment of counsel contribute to low rates of appeals on delinquency matters (Feld 2010; 
National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012b). Early and continued appointment protect individual 
and collective due process rights for youth in delinquency court. 
   
 
 
   
Indigence Determinations 
 
 Due process rights granted to youth in delinquency court include the right to appointed 
for youth determined indigent. The determination of indigency can serve as a barrier to 
appointment based on the presumption that begins the determination process (Puritz et al., 1995; 
National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012b; National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012). Indigency 
determinations that begin with the presumption a youth defendant has the financial resources to 
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pay for private counsel may prevent the youth from obtaining counsel (National Juvenile 
Defender Center, 2012b). Youth often find themselves immersed in the court proceedings 
quickly and without full comprehension of the process or the potential outcomes (Henning, 2009; 
May and Timmons, 2014). Further, the youth’s parents often bring an urgency to conclude the 
proceeding as quickly as possible, if the parents participate in the process at all (National 
Juvenile Defender Center 2012b). As a result, gathering and presenting financial information to 
the court to qualify as indigent becomes a heavy burden on the parents and a barrier to accessing 
defense counsel. Even if parents have the financial resources and do not meet the official 
indigency requirements, the parents may not spend the money on legal representation for the 
youth (National Juvenile Defender Center, 2012). While the youth holds the right to counsel, the 
youth does not hold the financial resources to hire counsel; parents hold these resources and the 
power to decide how to spend them. Alternatively, a presumption of indigence begins with the 
assumption that youth do not have the financial means to hire counsel and places the burden on 
the state to prove otherwise. A presumption of indigence also reflects the likely financial 
resources of the child, who maintains the right to representation, without incorporating the 
financial status of the parent, who may not act in the best interests of the child (National Juvenile 
Defender Center, 2012b, Puritz et al; 1995). 
The prior research presents a series of trends upon which this dissertation project seeks to 
build. Deriving from justice policies and practices, studies indicate disparate treatment of non-
White racial groups and persons of lower socioeconomic status in the justice system. These 
studies correlate an increase in disparate outcomes for these population groups with an increase 
in the rate of non-White persons within communities. These similar findings appear in all three 
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areas of criminal and juvenile justice: police, courts, and corrections. Further, these disparate 
outcomes exist for non-White groups even though policies contain race-neutral language.  
The provision of due process through defense counsel in juvenile delinquency court is a 
critical protection against state power; however, the provision of and access to quality defense 
counsel remains limited in most states. While states vary in their legal provision of defense 
counsel in juvenile justice proceedings, common trends emerge in the barriers to accessing 
defense counsel, including: waiver, role confusion, timing and duration of appointment, and 
indigence determinations. Some states address and remove these barriers explicitly in statutes, 
court rules, and case law, while others remain silent and provide only a general provision of 
counsel. This dissertation project seeks to determine whether these “race-neutral” provisions of 
defense counsel correlate with the rates of non-White and lower socioeconomic status groups in 
states, as found in related areas of prior research.   
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Prior research establishes the differences in the administration of justice for youth as an 
ongoing, race- and socioeconomic-based problem of disparity. This dissertation establishes an 
exploratory inquiry into whether relationships exist among the demographic composition of 
states, the disproportionate contact of minority youth in the juvenile justice system, and the 
provision of due process protections through defense counsel. The primary research questions 
are: 
1) Are there significant relationships among the racial composition of states, the rates of 
disparate outcomes for youth in the juvenile justice system, and the provision of due 
process through defense counsel policies? 
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a. Do significant relationships exist between the racial/ethnic composition of a state 
and the racial/ethnic-based rate of contact with the juvenile justice system across 
all contact points? 
b. If yes, do policies with strong, explicit provisions and protections of access to 
defense counsel for youth in delinquency courts impact the relationship between 
state racial/ethnic composition and rates of contact with the juvenile justice 
system? 
2) Are there significant relationships among the socioeconomic composition of states, the 
rates of disparate outcomes for youth in the juvenile justice system, and the provision of 
due process through defense counsel policies? 
a. Do significant relationships exist between the socioeconomic composition of a 
state and the racial/ethnic-based rate of contact with the juvenile justice system 
across all contact points? 
b. If yes, do policies with strong, explicit provisions and protections of access to 
defense counsel for youth in delinquency courts impact the relationship between 
state socioeconomic composition and racial/ethnic-based rates of contact with the 
juvenile justice system? 
The prior research directs the hypotheses as: 
1) As the percent of minority populations increase in states, the rates of minority contact 
with the juvenile justice system will increase. 
2) As the due process protections in states increase, they will mediate and decrease the rates 
of minority contact with the juvenile justice system associated with percent minority.   
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3) As the socioeconomic status of populations decreases in the states, the rates of minority 
contact with the juvenile justice system will increase.  
4) As the due process protections in states increase, they will mediate and decrease the rates 
of minority contact with the juvenile justice system associated with the socioeconomic 
status indicators.  
The inquiry into the research questions encompasses a mixed methods approach involving 







This study focuses on three types of data: 1) state demographic data, 2) state policies on 
juvenile defense, and 3) state records of disproportionate minority contact with the juvenile 
justice system. The state-level data for this dissertation project all derives from public resources. 
The US Census provides the demographic data, the National Juvenile Defender Center offers a 
collection of data on state juvenile justice policies – including state legislation, case law, and 
court rules – on juvenile defense, and the Haywood Burns Institute shares data on disparate 
youth contact with the juvenile justice system. The US Census and Haywood Burns Institute 
presents quantitative data, while the National Juvenile Defender Center offers qualitative data on 
state policies.  
 The state demographic data comes from the US Census American Community Survey, 
which provides three-year averages for each measure of socioeconomic status and racial 
composition of the states. This project uses the five-year averages for 2013 as measures for state 
demographics. The Haywood Burns Institution provides downloadable data for the public 
through its “Balanced Juvenile Justice” initiative. This data derives from the Office of Juvenile 
Justice Delinquency Prevention (Haywood Burns Institute). The counts from the 2013 data set 
for US states comprise the contact-point data for the variable computation and analysis in this 
study.  
The National Juvenile Defender Center compiled the state laws on defense counsel. To 
compile these data, attorneys and law students, trained in legal research and juvenile defense, 
collect the qualitative data for the National Juvenile Defender Center using Westlaw, a legal 
search engine designed for practicing attorneys and law-makers. Westlaw provides all state-level 
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statutes, court rules, and case-law for each state, including the most up-to-date statutes and case 
law. The National Juvenile Defender Center updates the policies by state, as the organization has 
the capacity to do this work; thus, state policies presented on the website range from 2013 to 
2016. The data-cleaning process for the state policies includes identifying the policies in place in 




The quantitative analysis contains three types of variables: demographic variables, 
contact-point variables, and due process variables. The data limitations (discussed further below) 
associated with the disproportionate minority contact (DMC) variables dictated the use of 2013 
data for 34 states. The qualitative analysis encompassed all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia to conceptualize, define, code, and transpose the qualitative data into quantitative data. 
Following the qualitative analysis, transposing the qualitative data into quantitative data, the 34 
states available in the DMC data are used in the quantitative analysis.  
The independent variables reflect the theoretical structure of the study with a focus on 
groups often lacking power in the United States: non-White groups, specifically Blacks, and 
people of a lower socioeconomic status. The state demographic variables serve as the 
independent variables. These include the percent Black, percent Hispanic, and percent White. 
The US Census presents these data as percentages of the total state population. The analysis also 
contains an inquiry into the role of diversity in the state. To examine this, a diversity index is 
calculated based on the percent Black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian (including Native 
American, Alaskan Native, and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander) and White in each state. The 
socioeconomic variables include the percent in poverty in the state, the percent of people with a 
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Bachelors degree or higher degree, and the percent unemployed in the civilian workforce in each 
state. 
The contact-points for racially disparate outcomes serve as the dependent variables in this 
analysis. The Haywood Burns Institute presents the state-level DMC data as counts. Prior to the 
analysis in this dissertation project, the DMC counts are transposed into rates that take into 
consideration the corresponding rate of the race/ethnicity within the greater population. All the 
contact-point variables represent the rate per 100,000 people of the same race/ethnicity in the 
state. These variables include the following contact points for Black, Latino/a, and White youth: 
arrest, detention, diversion, petition, delinquency finding, confinement, and probation.  
The due process variables serve as mediating variables in the analysis. The qualitative 
data (state policies) are transposed into quantitative data through a qualitative coding process. 
The below process ultimately conceptualizes and operationalizes due process protections through 
the provision of defense counsel into five variables: right to counsel, waiver of counsel, 




The qualitative analysis began with an identification of themes and categories for the data 
set. The researcher reviewed the entire data set of statutes, court rules, and regulations for 
general themes throughout the data. After the initial review, the researcher went through the data 
set again and recorded the themes that emerged from each set of state policies on the provision of 
juvenile defense in delinquency court. The resulting set of themes from this stage of analysis 
encompasses all of the data as a whole and includes: right to counsel, indigency determination, 
waiver of counsel, and post-dispositional representation.  
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The theme of right to counsel emerged from the data as a basic premise for the provision 
of defense counsel for youth in delinquency court. The theme encompasses the components of 
defense specific to when and how defense counsel represents youth in court. The post disposition 
theme extends the right to counsel into proceedings after the delinquency court rules on a 
disposition for the adjudicated youth. Post-disposition, for the purposes of this inquiry into the 
data, includes modifications of the disposition, addressing conditions of confinement, and the 
appeals process. The themes of waiver of counsel and indigency determinations comprise 
potential limitations to the right to counsel. Challenges demonstrating indigency and uninformed 
(or unintentional) waiver of counsel erodes right to counsel provisions; thus comprising two 
separate themes.  
Following identification of themes, the researcher reviews the data set for categories 
within the themes. This review consists of reading through each set of state policies and 
recording the manner in which each state addressed the designated themes. From there, the 
researcher identifies the categories under each theme, representing the entire date set. These 
categories emerge from the data set as a whole; no single state contained all of the categories in 
its policies for juvenile defense. The chart below lists the themes and corresponding categories.  
 
Table 1: Themes and Categories for Qualitative Data 
Right to 
Counsel 











Youth read/informed of rights  
 
 
Read rights and/or waived 
rights in presence of counsel  
 






























Availability of a 
continuance for 
the proceedings 
















role of counsel 
appointment of counsel or 
reading of right) at detention 
hearing 
 
Youth consulted with counsel  
 
Counsel investigated facts 
 
Youth waives knowingly  
 






Youth waives voluntarily 
 
Youth informed of the 
charges, possible dispositions, 
possible defenses, knows 
consequences of charges, 
consequences of no 
representation, collateral 
consequences of 
adjudication  (any of these) 
 
Youth expressly waives right 
to counsel  
 
Waiver in writing /signed/on 
the record  
 
Parent, guardian, adult, et al. 
not allowed to waive right 
 
Court verifies waiver made 
knowingly and voluntarily 
 
Court holds hearing on waiver  
 
Youth informed of right at 
other stages of proceeding, 





















order (including change 
to placement) 
 
Modify custody orders  
 


































(waiver of jurisdiction 
to adult court) 
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Standby counsel appointed for 












The assignment of numerical scores relied on the juvenile defense literature.  The 
literature establishes and explains the implications of policy and practices on the provision of due 
process and defense counsel. As a whole, it makes connections between the protections for 
defense counsel the manner in which these protections impact whether youth have access to 
defense counsel. For example, protections such as requirements for waiver of counsel to occur in 
writing, after consult with counsel, and without the undue influence of parents who potentially 
present conflicts of interest for the youth help to ensure youth do not waive counsel without 
understanding the legal impact. As established by the literature, explicit inclusion of these 
components provides more legal protection for youth than a general requirement for youth to 
“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waive counsel.   
Research has not established which explicit provisions provide more protection than 
others, so each explicit protection received one point in every category. The one point reflects 
that the explicit provision increases protection as compared silence (no provision).2 In order to 
receive the point, the statute, case law, or court rule must explicitly state the protection. The 
language in each set of state statutes, cases, and regulations differ, so the analysis relies on 
                                                 
2 The exception consists of points allotted for waiver of counsel. A few states do not allow for 
waiver of counsel. This restriction guarantees defense counsel representation; however, it 
removes the option for the defendant to make a decision regarding representation. To accurately 
capture this difference, the scoring system allocates additional points to the provision of counsel, 
as depicted in Appendix A.  
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keywords and patterns to identify whether the content of the state policies provide or limit due 
process protections.  
The below section discusses the categories that emerged from the content analysis, 
examples from state policies, and the scoring process as supported by the literature. Appendix A 
includes a chart of the themes, categories, and the full numeric scoring for the qualitative 
analysis.  
 
Right to Counsel  
 
The category for “timing of appointment” contains different procedural points at which 
a youth may receive defense counsel. As a result, the category includes subcategories of: intake 
following arrest, pre-petition detention, post-petition, and adjudicatory trial. The subcategories 
reflect the language presented in the policies. It acknowledges that different states may use 
different language to refer to the same procedural point for appointing counsel. The timing of 
appointment may differ based on local jurisdictional practices, case-based differences, and the 
day of the week. For example, intake may occur at the same time as a decision to file a petition, 
or the filing of a petition may occur well after intake. The subcategories reflect the language 
present in the policies for timing of appointment.  
Related to the timing of appointment, the “court expressly mandated to appoint 
counsel” category reflects the difference between a mandate to appoint counsel (such as using 
the term “shall”) and the discretion to appoint counsel (such as using the term “may”).  
The category for “procedural representation points” depicts whether defense policies 
state the multiple procedural points at which youth have a right to counsel in the juvenile justice 
system. This category differs from the appointment category by recognizing policies for 
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explicitly preserving the right to counsel beyond the initial appointment. It does not include 
references to post-adjudicatory representation, which comprises a separate theme with its own 
categories. The category begins with the first procedural point of intake extends to the 
adjudication decision. For each explicit statement of representation, the provision receives a 
point. 
The “informed of right to counsel” category acknowledges the language in some state 
policies requiring youth to be informed of the right to counsel in a particular manner or at a 
particular point in the process. Informing a youth to the right to counsel does not necessarily also 
mean appointment of counsel at that time, which is why this category stands distinct from the 
appointment category. However, some overlap occurs between this category and the appointment 
of counsel category, depending on the language of state policies. To address the distinction and 
possible overlap of categories, some states received points in this category and the appointment 
of counsel category, depending on the explicit language in the state policies. As an example: In 
Idaho, youth are informed of their right to counsel “as early as possible in the proceedings, and 
in any event before the hearing of the petition on the merits” Idaho Code Ann. § 20-514(4). 
The category for defense counsel “representation during interrogation” consists of 
explicit language allowing for defense counsel to be present during interrogations of youth that 
may occur prior to or after petition. Similarly, the “opportunity to confer with counsel” 
category denotes language allowing youth to confer with counsel prior to official court 
proceedings. This category differs from the opportunity to confer with counsel category under 
the waiver of counsel theme, which reflects a consult specific to the waiver decision. Under the 
theme of right to counsel, this category reflects a broader requirement for counsel to consult with 
the youth prior to appearing before a judge or allowing the youth to make case-related decisions. 
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The “availability of a continuance for the proceedings due to lack of counsel” 
category reflects the role of the court in protecting access to counsel. A court that allows for the 
proceedings to pause until youth obtains defense counsel representation, or waives counsel in the 
legally prescribed manner, helps to ensure due process protections for youth.  As an example, “if 
a child appears in court without counsel for a [waiver hearing or an adjudicatory hearing]… and 
the child has not previously waived the right to the assistance of counsel in accordance with 
[state laws], the court shall continue and the clerk shall reschedule the waiver or adjudicatory 
hearing” and the public defender shall represent the child. (Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 
3-8A-20(e)). 
“Limitations to representation based on possible dispositional outcomes” – this 
category acknowledges that some states provide a right to defense counsel only when youth face 
more restrictive dispositions as the result of a delinquent adjudication. For example, in 
Massachusetts, youth have the right to counsel in “a proceeding where the issue is whether the 
child will be found to be delinquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty is comparable in 
seriousness to a felony prosecution” (Mass. R. Crim. P. 8).  
The category for when state policies “addresses role of counsel” recognizes the role of 
the defense counsel to protect the express interests of the youth in delinquency court. While the 
juvenile justice system maintains a rehabilitative goal to work for the best interests of youth, the 
defense attorney’s role is to uphold the express interest of the youth. This role runs counter to the 
traditional role of the guardian ad litem (most often representing youth in child welfare 
proceedings) to represent the best interests of the youth. Policies the explicitly acknowledge the 
adversarial role of the defense counsel fall into this category. As an example of policy language 
for this category: in New Hampshire, “When an attorney is appointed as counsel for a child, 
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representation shall include counsel and investigative, expert and other services, including 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses, as may be necessary to protect the rights of the 
child.” N.H. Rev. Stat. § 169-B:12(I-a). Related, if the language of the statute allows for a 
guardian ad litem to serve as defense counsel, without clarifying the differences in roles, the 
analysis process recognizes this potential role confusion. As an example, in Hawaii, “[T]he judge 
shall appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent the person at all stages of the 
proceedings, including appeal” (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-87(a)). 
States policies recognizing that parental interests do not always align with youth interests 
fall into the “removes conflict of interest with parents” category. Parents often have the ability 
to influence youth decisions regarding representation, and sometimes parents have interests that 
run counter to the youth’s interests (potentially both the best interest of the youth and the express 
interest of the youth). States that address this potential conflict of interest offer a stronger 
framework for access to defense counsel. As an example, in Iowa, ““If the child is represented 
by counsel and the court determines that there is a conflict of interest between the child and the 
child's parent, guardian or custodian and that the retained counsel could not properly represent 
the child as a result of the conflict, the court shall appoint other counsel to represent the child 
[…]” (Iowa Code § 232.11(4)). 
 
Waiver of Counsel  
 
The “read/informed of rights as part of waiver process” and “read rights and/or 
waived rights in presence of counsel” categories protect youth by ensuring that youth know 
their right to counsel at the time of the waiver decision. The second category furthers this intent 
by requiring defense counsel to be present at this time as an increased protection. If the youth 
consults with counsel as part of the waiver process, the state policies meet the requirements for 
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the third category, youth consults with counsel. As an example, in Florida, “[W]aiver of 
counsel can occur only after the child has had a meaningful opportunity to confer with counsel 
regarding the child’s right to counsel, the consequences of waiving counsel, and any other factors 
that would assist the child in making the decision to waive counsel.” Fla. R. Juv. P. R. 8.165.  
Separate from the above categories for informing youth of rights to counsel prior to 
waiver, the categories for youth comprehension of the right to counsel include: (1) “youth 
waives knowingly,” (2) “youth waives with understanding,” (3) “youth waives 
intelligently/competently,” and (4) “youth waives voluntarily.” Each standard contributes to 
increasing access to defense counsel by providing a check on whether the youth understands the 
implications of the waiver of counsel. State policies do not use all 4 categories; rather, the 
categories represent the range of language state policies on waiver decisions and many states 
incorporate at least two standards.   
The “informed of rights” (through either appointment of counsel or the reading of 
rights) at detention hearing category informs the waiver decision; this category may overlap with 
the similar category under the right to counsel theme, and states may receive credit for providing 
information on rights to counsel at detention hearings in both areas.  
If counsel looks into the facts of the case prior to waiver, the state policies fall into the 
“counsel investigated facts” category. Fact-finding prior to the waiver decision allows defense 
counsel to provide more information to the youth regarding potential legal outcomes and the 
trajectory of the case. This contributes a well-informed decision by the youth to waive or 
maintain defense counsel.  
When “youth are informed of the charges, possible dispositions, possible defenses, 
knows consequences of charges, consequences of no representation, or collateral 
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consequences of adjudication,” this information allows them to better understand the 
consequences of waiving the right to defense counsel. If the state policies explicitly reference 
any of the components of this category, the state receives a point in this category. 
The “youth expressly waives right to counsel” category protects the right to counsel by 
helping to ensure youth know they are waiving counsel. It limits unintentional waivers by 
eliminating implied waiver through actions or comments of youth not intended to waive counsel. 
If the state policies require the waiver to be in writing, the policies qualify for this category and 
the “waiver in writing/signed/one the record” category – a category that serves to collect a 
record of the waiver. Verbal waivers made in court do not meet the requirements of protection 
for this category, based on the lack of a transcribed court record in many juvenile courts.    
Recognizing the influence of parents over youth decisions and potential for conflicts of 
interest between parents and youth, even if these conflicts do not appear significant, the “parent, 
guardian, adult, et al. not allowed to waive right” category explicitly the decision-making 
process to the youth. This protects the decision from parent assumptions that the process will be 
faster, less expensive, or less punitive without defense counsel. Although parents maintain 
influence over their children, the decision to waive counsel still remains with the youth.   
The category for “court verification of waiver made knowingly and voluntarily” 
protects the youth right to defense counsel by providing a formal check on how well the youth 
understands waiver of counsel. If the state policies require the “court to hold a hearing on 
waiver” of counsel, this formal check also counts for the verification category. As an example, 
in Minnesota, “If the court accepts the child’s waiver, it shall state on the record the findings and 
conclusions that form the basis for its decision and shall appoint standby counsel.” Minn. Juv. 
Ct. R. P. 3.04(3). Further, in New York, the court holds a hearing to rebut the presumption youth 
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do not have the maturity to waive counsel. As a verification of waiver, the court must find that: 
“(a) The minor understands the nature of the charges, the possible dispositional alternatives and 
the possible defenses to the charges; (b) The minor possesses the maturity, knowledge and 
intelligence necessary to conduct his or her own defense. (c) Waiver is in the best interest of the 
minor” (National Juvenile Defender Center citing the N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 249-a). 
If the “court informs youth of the right to counsel at multiple stages of the 
proceeding,” after youth have waived counsel, the state policies fall into this category. This 
policy protects youth right to counsel even after waive, by allowing the court to appoint counsel 
if the youth changes his or her mind after initial waiver of counsel at the start of the court 
proceedings. Similarly, if state policies allow for the “appointment of standby counsel” to 
assist youth after waiver of counsel and requesting counsel, the state policies fall into this 
category. As an example, in Pennsylvania, “If a child waives the right to counsel, the court may 
appoint stand-by counsel.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6337.1(b)(4). 
 
Indigency Determination  
 
The indigency determination theme contains the fewest categories of all the themes. 
These categories focus on the process for determining indigency rather than the threshold for 
indigency in each state. This category does not take into consideration the income level under 
which the family falls. The category for “indigency does not block representation process” 
ensures the determination for indigency does not result in the court proceedings moving forward 
without defense counsel representation as a result of an incomplete indigency determination. 
State policies that require the defendant to pay a “fee to process the indigency determination” 
limit the access to defense counsel for youth who do not have the financial means to pay the fee. 
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Potentially, if the youth does not have the means to pay the fee, the youth will not have access to 
appointed counsel as an indigent youth and will end up without representation.  As an examples, 
in Washington, D.C., “if counsel is not retained for the [youth], or if it does not appear that 
counsel will be retained, counsel shall be appointed for the [youth]” (Super. Ct. Juv. R. 44(a)(1)). 
In Tennessee, the parent, guardian or custodian of the juvenile is assessed a $50 administrative 
fee (Tenn. Code § 37-1-126(c)(1)). If the youth or parents cannot afford that amount, the fee can 
be waived or reduced; if the youth or parents can pay more, the fee may be increased up to a 
maximum of $200 (Tenn. Code § 37-1-126(c)(2)).  
The indigency determination theme does encompass the assets the court considers for the 
determination. The presumption of indigence category places the burden on the state to show 
the youth defendant does not qualify as indigent. These state policies automatically qualify youth 
as indigent and in need of appointment counsel unless proven otherwise.  The category “youth 
assets considered only” requires the state policies to express explicitly the parents’ assets do not 
factor into the indigency determination and/or the determination relies solely on the youth’s 
assets. Policies in this category align with the prior categories recognizing the possibility that 
parents hold interests that differ or conflict with youth. The policies allow greater access to 
defense counsel when taking into consideration only youth assets. As an example, in Ohio, 
“Juveniles are presumed indigent. In determining the eligibility of a child for court-appointed 
counsel in juvenile court, only the juvenile’s income shall be considered when determining if 







Post-Disposition Representation  
 
The post-disposition representation theme contains categories related to the review of the 
adjudication proceedings, changes to court orders, conditions of confinement, and extended state 
jurisdiction over the youth. Specific to review of the adjudication proceedings are the following 
categories: appeals, appeals of a final order, motion preparation, post-disposition hearings, 
review of dispositional orders, modification of disposition order, modification of custody 
order, probation revocation, probation violation, representation while on probation/parole 
or seeking parole, parole revocation, parole modification, and hearings on aftercare 
revocation. The multiple categories that address similar type of review allow the coding to 
capture the difference in language across the state juvenile justice systems and encompass the 
transition of youth into adult systems (through the transfer/waiver to adult court process that 
differs by state).  
State policies addressing post-dispositional representation explicitly state the procedural 
point qualifying for representation. For example, in Minnesota, the state policies list the 
following procedural points for post-dispositional representation: probation violation, 
modification of disposition, and appeals from delinquency adjudications or from extended 
jurisdiction juvenile convictions (Minn. Juv. Ct. R. P. 3.02; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.25(a)(3)). 
Categories specific to representation related to confinement include: conditions of 
confinement, recommitment, and extension of placement and/or jurisdiction. Representation 
to uphold the due process rights of youth while the state restricts their liberty through 
confinement falls to the responsibility of juvenile defense attorneys, especially when youth 
remain under the juvenile court jurisdiction. The explicit direction from state policies to maintain 
 
51 
representation of youth through confinement increases the access to defense attorneys during this 
process. As an example, in Kentucky, a youth “in the custody of the Department of Juvenile 
Justice and is residing in a residential treatment center or detention center is entitled to be 
represented on a legal claim related to his or her confinement involving violations of federal or 




The quantitative analysis contains univariate, bivariate, and multivariate models to 
explore the relationships among the variables. The univariate analysis contains descriptive 
statistics and histograms to identify the central tendencies and distributions of the data for each 
variable. As illustrated in the results sections below, the univariate analysis dictates the use of 
negative binomial regression to identify the relationships among the variables. The bivariate 
analysis serves as the baseline model to determine whether a relationship exists between the 
demographic composition of a state and the disparate racial/ethnic contact within the juvenile 
justice system. The multivariate analysis then adds the due process variables to determine 
whether the protections mediate the initial relationship between the state demographics and 





                                                 































































The multivariate models contain only three variables to maintain statistical power despite 
the low N of 34. As a result, the analysis contains univariate analysis of all variables, separate 
baseline models of the socioeconomic and racial/ethnic composition of states with the disparate 
contact variables, and then separate multivariate models for each point of contact with the due 
process protections. The below results section presents the findings from the univariate, 






































The data analysis contains univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analysis. The univariate 
analysis looks at frequencies, central tendency, variability, and normality for the due process, 
state demographic, and rates of contact with the juvenile justice system by race. Based on the 
univariate analysis, the bivariate and multivariate analysis finds statistical relationships among 
the variables using negative binomial regress. Bivariate analysis determines whether the 
variables maintain a statistically significant relationship and the multivariate analysis introduce 
the role of due process as a mediator of the bivariate relationship. The limitations of available 
data restrict the multivariate analysis to incorporating three variables to maintain statistical 
power within the models.  
 
Data Description  
 
The data used to conceptualize the independent and dependent variables consist of 
measures for due process protections, state demographics, and disproportionate minority contact 
with the juvenile justice systems at multiple contact points within the system. The data available 
allowed for the analysis of 34 states. For each of the 34 states, Table 2 characterizes the central 
tendency of the data, including the mean, standard deviation, and skewness of each variable.   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
             N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness 
Due Process Protections 
Right to Counsel Protections 34 4.41 1.940 -0.493 
Post-Disposition Advocacy Protections 34 1.53 1.522 0.817 
Indigence Determination Protections 34 0.26 0.666 0.957 
Waiver of Counsel Protections 34 3.97 2.747 0.284 




  As established by the qualitative analysis, the due process protections comprise five 
variables: right to counsel, waiver of counsel, indigence determination, post-dispositional 
advocacy, and total due process. The mean for the right to counsel variable is 4.41, indicating a 
central tendency of the 34 states to have a score of 4.41, which resides halfway between the 
Demographics 
Percent of Population Hispanic 34 12.1118 10.859 1.803 
Percent of Population White 34 69.1176 16.702 -0.737 
Percent of Population Black 34 8.9794 8.677 1.109 
Population Diversity Index 34 0.5540 0.1693 2.362 
Percent of Population with a BA or 
Higher  
34 19.3381 3.2648 4.359 
Percent Unemployed  34 8.6446 1.968 5.572 
Percent of Individuals in Poverty 34 25.1240 2.4844 0.248 
DMC-Related Rates (All per 100K) 
Black Arrest Rate  33 4328.0423 10168.106 3.441 
Black Delinquency Finding Rate  34 487.1024 567.767 2.821 
Black Petition Rate  34 807.9749 703.356 1.799 
Black Detention Rate  34 568.3656 481.952 1.122 
Black Diversion Rate  34 540.1225 628.789 2.233 
Black Confinement Rate  34 68.1338 110.657 2.613 
Black Probation Rate  34 379.1754 456.703 1.571 
Latino Arrest Rate  34 403.2588 546.408 3.180 
Latino Delinquency Rate  34 163.1053 250.552 2.334 
Latino Petition Rate  34 252.4001 306.474 1.473 
Latino Detention Rate  34 173.4540 192.558 1.871 
Latino Diversion Rate  34 189.8373 245.340 3.793 
Latino Confinement Rate  34 24.3560 53.338 2.094 
Latino Probation Rate  34 120.5989 154.747 0.631 
White Arrest Rate  34 299.4985 243.196 1.029 
White Petition Rate  34 145.2136 113.327 2.110 
White Detention Rate  34 72.2105 65.898 2.579 
White Diversion Rate 34 126.1386 104.808 1.220 
White Delinquency Finding Rate  34 80.5961 82.279 2.926 
White Confinement Rate  34 8.7582 13.363 3.243 
White Probation Rate  34 65.1801 74.079 3.537 
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possible scores of zero through eight. The mean for waiver of counsel is 3.97, meaning the state 
policies for waiver of counsel have a central tendency of 3.97 on a zero to ten scale. The mean of 
3.97 falls below the midway point of five on the scale, indicating fewer protections for waiver 
are in place among most states included in the analysis. The mean for indigence determination is 
.26, based on a small scale of negative one to three. The small mean of .26 indicates most states 
in the analysis have few or no due process protections for youth during the indigency 
determination. The mean for the post-disposition advocacy variable is 1.53 on a scale of zero to 
nineteen. The low mean indicates most states in the analysis do not provide many due process 
protections post-disposition. The total due process score reflects the combined protections of 
each variable and has a mean of 10.18 on a scale of possible points from negative four to 57. The 
mean of 10.18 reflects the few due process protections available for youth in state policies 
among states in analysis.  
The demographic variables represent the racial and socio-economic status of each state 
population. The mean for the percent White is 69.1%. This indicates 69.1% of the population 
identifies as White on average for the states included in the analysis. This percentage represents 
the largest demographic for the states as a whole. The mean for the percent Hispanic is 12.1, 
indicating the average Hispanic population comprises 12.1% of the entire state for the states 
included in the analysis. The mean for the percent Black rounds to 9%, indicating the states 
included in the analysis have, on average, 9% of their population identifying as Black. 
Considered together, the means indicate the states in the analysis have a large percent of their 
population identifying as White, followed by Hispanic with a much lower percent, and then 
Black with a slightly lower percentage than Hispanic.  
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The variables for Disproportionate Minority Contact comprise rates of youth by race as 
they move through multiple contact points in the juvenile justice system from entrance with 
arrest to confinement or probation before exiting the system. The rates of contact are all per 
100,000 people in the total state population. For Black youth, the mean for arrest rate is 4328.04; 
the mean for detention is 568.37; the mean for diversion is 540.12; the mean for petition is 
807.90; the mean for a delinquent finding is 487.1; the mean for confinement is 68.13; and the 
mean for probation is 379.17. For Latino/a youth, the mean for arrest rate is 403.26; the mean for 
detention is 173.45; the mean for diversion is 189.84; the mean for petition is 252.40; the mean 
for a delinquent finding is 163.11; the mean for confinement is 24.36; and the mean for probation 
is 379.18. For White youth, the mean for arrest rate is 299.50; the mean for detention is 72.21; 
the mean for diversion is 126.14; the mean for petition is 145.21; the mean for a delinquent 
finding is 80.60; the mean for confinement is 8.76; and the mean for probation is 65.18.  
The means depict the average rates for the youth among the states included in the 
analysis. For example, on average, 4328 Black youth are arrested for every 100,000 people living 
in a state, which serves a comparison point across population demographics, races/ethnicities of 
youth in the system, and points of contact with the juvenile justice system. States with rates 
below the mean have fewer Black youth arrested than the average and states above the mean 
have more Black youth than the average. In the same manner, the means of all contact points for 
each race/ethnicity allow for comparisons across the variables. 
The below histogram figures depict the distribution of each variable. The histograms are 
grouped by variable type. The due process variables, derived from the qualitative analysis, have 
normal distributions, as determined by the skewness of each variable. The ideal skewness value 
for a normal distribution is zero with values between -1 and 1qualifying as normally distributed. 
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The right to counsel histogram depicts a skewness of -0.493; the waiver of counsel histogram 
depicts a skewness of 0.284; the indigency determination historgram shows a skewness of 0.957; 
the post-dispositional advocacy histogram depicts a skewness of  0.817; and the total due process 
histogram depicts a skewness of 0.283. Each of the due process variables fall within the -1 to 1 
range and therefore qualify as normally distributed. 
 








The histograms in Figure 3 depict the distributions for the state demographic variables, 
including race/ethnicity and socio-economic status. The race/ethnicity variables have mostly a 
non-normal distribution as depicted by the histograms and identified by the skewness statistic. 
The percent Black of a state population has a skewness of 1.109. The percent Hispanic of a state 
population has a positive skewness of 1.803, and the percent White of a state population has a 
skewness of -0.737. The diversity index, measuring the diversity within a state population, has a 
positive skewness of 2.362. The skewness statistics indicate the only variable with a normal 
distribution is the percent White. The other race/ethnicity variables fall outside the -1 to 1 range 
as positively or negatively skewed beyond normality. 









The variables conceptualizing socio-economic status include the percent of the state population 
holding a Bachelor’s degree or higher, the percent unemployed, and the percent in poverty. The 
data for higher education has a skewness of 4.359; the data for unemployment has a skewness of 
5.572; and the skewness for percent in poverty variable is .248. Of the socio-economic status 
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variable, only the percent in poverty has a normal distribution. The other variables have 
positively skewed data disqualifying them from a statistically normal distribution. 
The histograms in Figure 4 depict the distributions of the disproportionate minority 
contact variables. These variables contain data for each contact point in the juvenile justice 
system by race/ethnicity. The histograms below are grouped by contact point, allowing for 
comparisons across race/ethnicities. At the arrest contact point, the rate of White arrests has a 
skewness of 1.029; the rate of Black arrests has a skewness of 3.441: the rate of Latino/a arrests 
has a skewness of 3.180. All three of these variables are positively skewed with the White arrest 
rate the closest to a normal distribution; however, all three variables have a non-normal 
distribution. 






The histograms in Figure 5 depict the data for the detention contact point. At this contact 
point, the skewness for the white detention rate data is 2.579. The skewness for the Black 
detention rate variable is 1.122, and the skewness for the Latino/a detention rate is 1.871. The 
positive skewness statistics and histograms illustrate the non-normal distribution of all three 
variables.  




The histograms in Figure 6 depict the data for the diversion contact point. At this contact point, 
the skewness for the white diversion rate data is 1.220. The skewness for the Black diversion rate 
variable is 2.233, and the skewness for the Latino/a diversion rate is 3.793. All three of these 
variables have a positive skew and a non-normal distribution. 
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Figure 7 contains histograms showing the distribution of the petition contact point 
variables. At this contact point, the White petition skewness is 2.110; the Black skewness is 
1.799; and the Latino/a skewness is 1.473. All three variables show a positive skewness, 


















Figure 8 contains histograms for the variables at the delinquency finding point of contact. 
The histograms depict the rate at which youth receive delinquent adjudications from the court. 
The white delinquency rate has a skewness of 2.926; the Black delinquency rate has a skewness 
of 2.821; and the Latino/a delinquency rate’s skewness is 2.334. Similar to the other contact-

















The histograms in Figure 9 depict the confinement point of contact with the juvenile 
justice system. The White confinement rate has a skewness of 3.243; the skewness statistic for 
the Black confinement rate is 2.613; and the Latino/a confinement rate statistic for skewness is 

















Figure 10 contains the final set of histograms for the contact points with the juvenile 
justice system, depicting the probation contact point. As depicted in the histograms, the skewness 
statistic for the White probation rate is 3.537; the skewness of the Black probation rate is 1.571; 



















The contact-point (disproportionate minority contact) variables serve in the analysis as 
the dependent variables, which help direct the quantitative analytic approach. The positively-
skewed, non-normal distributions require alternative regression approaches to ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. The use of negative binomial regression best fits the data distribution 







 Tables 3 through 8 below provide the statistical results from the bivariate and 
multivariate analysis. Using negative binomial regression, the statistical results demonstrate the 
relationship among the racial/ethnic composition of state populations, the rate of youth contact 
with the juvenile justice system, and the mediating impact of due process protections. The 
analysis also included tests of associations among the socio-economic-status composition of 
states and the rate of youth contact with the juvenile justice system, yielding no significant 
relationships. The statistical results of this portion of the analysis is located in Appendix B. The 
lack of statistical significance in these relationships eliminate the relevance of socio-economic 
status for the purpose of determining the mediation effect of due process protections. Thus, the 
remainder of the quantitative analysis will focus on the statistically significant findings from the 
relationships among race and the juvenile justice system. 
 Table 3 contains the statistical results for the arrest contact point. The first baseline model 
looks at the relationship between the White arrest rate for youth and the percent of the state 
population that identifies as Black. The statistically significant relationship between the two 
variables produces a coefficient of -.0014044. This means for every percent Black increase in the 
state population the White youth arrest rate decreases by -.0014044 per 100,000 people. When 
the right to counsel variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient 
changes to -.0014794. When the waiver of counsel variable is added to the baseline model, the 
relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0013914. When the indigency 
determination variable is added to the baseline model, the relationship remains significant and 
the coefficient changes to -.001749. When the post-disposition advocacy variable is added to the 
baseline model, the relationship no longer remains significant and the coefficient changes to -
 
69 
0.0011915. When the total due process variable is added to the baseline model, the relationship 
remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0013334. 
Table 3: Arrest Contact Point 
 White Arrest Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model *-.0014044   **.0013463 -0.0002785 -0.0001669 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel *-.0014794  **.0013581  -0.0002084 -0.0000877 
Waiver of Counsel *-.0013914  **.0013296  -0.0003 -0.0001936 
Indigency Det *-.001749  **.0015383  -0.0003731 -0.0002114 
Post-Dispo Advocacy -0.0011915 **.0013349 -0.0003258 -0.0002114 
Total Due Process  *-.0013334  **.0013461  -0.0003455 -0.0002189 
 Black  Arrest Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model **-.0001122  -0.0000228 8.05E-06 0.0000106 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **.0000403  -0.0000245 *8.33e-06  0.0000108 
Waiver of Counsel **-.0001129  -0.0000249 8.07E-06 0.0000104 
Indigency Det **-.0001117  -0.0000236 *9.45e-06 0.000013 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0001084 -0.000027 8.26E-06 0.0000109 
Total Due Process  **-.0001118  -0.0000245 7.32E-06 9.82E-06 
 Latino/a Arrest Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  **.0006272  **.0006272  -0.000048 0.0000138 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.0009304 **.0006055  -0.0000205 0.0000371 
Waiver of Counsel **-.0009171 **.0006184  -0.000051 9.59E-06 
Indigency Det **-.0009279  ** .0006278  -0.0000478 0.0000137 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0008709  ** .0006051 -0.0000523 8.49E-06 
Total Due Process  **-.0009178  **.000624  -0.0000512 0.0000104 
*=.05  **=.01 
 The baseline model depicting the relationship between the White youth arrest rate and the 
percent of the state population identifying as Hispanic returns a significant relationship with a 
coefficient of .0013463. This indicates for every percent increase in the Hispanic population of a 
state the White arrest rate increases by .0013463 per 100,000 people. When the right to counsel 
variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to .0013581. 
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When the waiver of counsel variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the 
coefficient changes to 0013296. When the indigency determination variable is added, the 
relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to .0015383. When the post-
disposition variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to 
0013349. When the total due process variable is added, the relationship remains significant and 
the coefficient changes to .0013461. 
 The only baseline model that produces a statistically significant relationship is the model 
encompassing the Black youth arrest rate and the percent of the state population identifying as 
Black. The baseline model establishes a statistically significant relationship with a coefficient of 
-.0001122. This means for every percent increase in the Black population in a state the Black 
youth arrest rate decreases by .0001122 per 100,000 youth. When the due process variable is 
added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to .0000403. When the 
waiver of counsel variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient 
changes to -.0001129. When the indigency determination variable is added, the relationship 
remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0001117. When the post-dispositional 
advocacy variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to -
.0001084. When the total due process variable is added, the relationship remains significant and 
the coefficient changes to .0001118.  
Table 4 contains the statistical results for the detention contact point. The first baseline 
model identifies a statistically significant relationship between the percent of the state population 
identifying as Black and the White youth detention rate. This baseline model is the only 
statistically significant relationship between race/ethnicity and the White detention rate. This 
model produces a coefficient of -.0101135. This means for every percent increase in the Black 
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population of a state the White detention rate decreases by .0101135 per 100,000 people. When 
the right to counsel variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient 
changes to -.010146. When the waiver of counsel variable is added, the relationship remains 
significant and the coefficient changes to -.010279. When the indigency determination variable is 
added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0103108. When the 
post-dispositional advocacy variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the 
coefficient changes to -.0096602. When the total due process variable is added, the relationship 
remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.010232. 
Table 4: Detention Contact Point 
 White Detention Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  **-.0101135 0.0020368 0.0005971 0.0008273 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.010146  0.001689 0.0009244 0.0011081 
Waiver of Counsel **-.010279 0.0020923 0.0005895 0.0008013 
Indigency Det **-.0103108  0.0020819 0.0005868 0.0008302 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0096602  0.0018947 0.0005657 0.0007864 
Total Due Process  **-.010232  0.002067 0.0005805 0.0033556 
 Black Detention Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  **-.0014165  0.0001094 0.0001316 0.0001735 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.0014146  0.0000701 0.0001631 0.0002037 
Waiver of Counsel **-.0014135  0.0001173 0.0001309 0.0001697 
Indigency Det **-.0015744  0.0001236 0.0001383 0.0001891 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0013443  0.0001003 0.000129 0.0001693 
Total Due Process  **-.0013888 0.0001104 0.0001183 0.0001602 
 Latino/a Detention Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model **-.0036265  0.001225 0.0001743 0.0002869 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.0036253 0.001138 0.000268 0.0003718 
Waiver of Counsel **-.0036369  0.0012105 0.0001709 0.0002762 
Indigency Det **-0.0038385 0.001253 0.0001699 0.0002762 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0034807  0.0011657 0.0001642 0.0002744 
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Total Due Process  **-.0035941  0.0012196 0.0001607 0.0002724 
*=.05  **=.01 
The percent of the state population identifying as Black also has a significant relationship with 
the Black detention rate. The baseline model in Figure 1 (above) for the Black youth detention 
rate establishes a significant relationship with a coefficient of -.0014165. This means for every 
percent increase in the Black population in a state, the Black youth detention rate decreases by 
.0014165 per 100,000 people. When the right to counsel variable is added, the relationship 
remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0014146. When the waiver of counsel 
variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0014135. 
When the indigency determination variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the 
coefficient changes to -.0015744. When the variable is added, the relationship remains 
significant and the coefficient changes to -.0013443. When the variable is added, the relationship 
remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0013888. 
Further, the relationship between the percent of the state population identifying as Black 
and the detention rate of Latino/a youth also produces a statistically significant coefficient. The 
baseline model indicates a statistically significant relationship with a coefficient of -.0036265. 
This means for every percent increase in the Black population of a state the detention rate for 
Latino/a youth decreases by .0036265 per 100,000 people. When the right to counsel variable is 
added, the coefficient changes to -.0036253. When the waiver of counsel variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0036369. When the indigency determination variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -0.0038385. When the post-dispositional advocacy variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0034807. When the total due process variable is added, the coefficient 
changes to -.0035941. 
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As depicted in Table 4, the diversion point of contact maintains statistically significant 
relationships with the percent Blacks in each state also. The rate of White, Black, and Latino 
diversion rates all produce statistically significant associations with the percent Black of a state. 
The baseline model for the relationship between the percent Black and White diversion rate 
results in a statistically significant coefficient of -.0044393. This means for every percent 
increase in the Black population, the White diversion rate decreases by .0044393 per 100,000 
people. When the right to counsel variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the 
coefficient changes to -.0044492. When the waiver of counsel variable is added, the relationship 
remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0044847. When the indigency determination 
variable is added, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0049866. 
When the post-dispositional advocacy variable is added, the relationship remains significant and 
the coefficient changes to -.005715. When the total due process variable is added, the 
relationship remains significant and the coefficient changes to -.0054232. 
Table 4: Diversion Contact Point 
 White Diversion Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model **-.0044393  0.0003019 0.0001426 0.0003852 
Full Model Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.0044492  0.0003072 0.0001871 0.0004252 
Waiver of Counsel ** -.0044847  0.000489 0.0001713 0.0004569 
Indigency Det **-.0049866 0.0004012 0.0001604 0.000407 
Post-Dispo Advocacy ** -.005715  0.0007246 0.000217 0.0005053 
Total Due Process  **-.0054232  0.0004894 0.000217 0.0006687 
 Black Diversion Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model **-.0008889  -0.0001614 0.0000729 0.0000729 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.0008942  -0.0001552 0.0000802 0.0001149 
Waiver of Counsel **-.0009059  -0.0001333 0.0000768 0.0001198 
Indigency Det **-.0009392  -0.0001702 0.0000733 0.0001111 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.001017  -0.0001083 0.0000837 0.0001264 
Total Due Process  **-.0010393  -0.0001577 0.0000983 0.0001407 
 Latino/a Diversion Rate    
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 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model ** -.0020607  0.000942 0.0000294 0.0001198 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.0020566  0.0009512 0.0000347 0.0001224 
Waiver of Counsel ** -.002118  0.0009993 0.000037 0.0001386 
Indigency Det **-.0021388  0.0011807 0.0000364 0.0001277 
Post-Dispo Advocacy ** -.0024943  *.0011197  0.0000607 0.0001665 
Total Due Process  **-.0023877 0.0010424 0.0001021 0.0002058 
*=.05  **=.01 
Similar to the White diversion rate, the Black diversion rate also has a significant 
relationship with the percent Black population. The baseline model shows a significant 
relationship with a coefficient of -.0008889. This means for every percent increase in the percent 
Black population the Black diversion rate decreases by .0008889 per 100,000 people. When the 
right to counsel variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0008942. When the waiver of 
counsel variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0009059. When the indigency 
determination variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0009392. When the post-
dispositional advocacy variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.001017. When the total due 
process variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0010393. 
The Latino/a diversion rate also maintains a significant relationship with the percent 
Black. The baseline model coefficient is -.0020607, meaning for every one percent increase in 
the percent Black population the Latino/a diversion rate decreases by .0020607 per 100,000 
people. When the right to counsel variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0020566. When 
the waiver of counsel variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.002118. When the indigency 
determination variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0021388. When the post-
dispositional advocacy variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0024943. When the total 
due process variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0023877. 
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At the petition contact point, only the Latino/a petition rate has a statistically significant 
relationship with the race/ethnicity population variable of percent Black. As shown in Table 5, 
the baseline model has a coefficient of -.0013595, meaning for every percent increase in Black 
population the Latino/a petition rate decreases by .0013595 per 100,000. When the right to 
counsel variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0013531, indicating for every percent 
increase in Black population the Black petition rate decreases by .0013531 per 100,000 people. 
When the waiver of counsel variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0014079. When the 
indigency determination variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.00135. When the post-
dispositional advocacy variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0015212. When the total 
due process variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0014868. 
Table 5: Petition Contact Point 
 White Petition Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  0.0002528 0.0003405 -0.0000496 -0.0000396 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel 0.0003032 0.0003245 0.0000513 0.000034 
Waiver of Counsel 0.0000968 0.0006045 -0.0000377 2.01E-06 
Indigency Det 0.0000723 0.0003405 -0.0000268 -0.000033 
Post-Dispo Advocacy 0.0002747 0.0004714 -0.0000388 -0.000023 
Total Due Process  -0.000221 0.0004508 0.00008 0.0001127 
 Black Petition Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  -0.0003966 0.0000907 0.0000342 0.0000496 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel -0.0003935 0.0000816 0.0000436 0.0000582 
Waiver of Counsel -0.0004463 0.0001375 0.0000354 0.0000542 
Indigency Det -0.0004 0.0000927 0.0000351 0.0000496 
Post-Dispo Advocacy -0.0004157 0.0001274 0.0000384 0.0000554 
Total Due Process  -0.0004939 0.0001151 0.0000484 0.0000665 
 Latino/a Petition Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model *-.0013595  0.0006328 0.0000152 0.0000648 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel *-.0013531 0.0006252 0.0000287 0.0000781 
Waiver of Counsel *-.0014079  0.0007406 0.0000167 0.0000709 
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Indigency Det *-.00135  0.0006327 0.0000183 0.0000654 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0015212  0.0007582 0.000029 0.0000845 
Total Due Process  **-.0014868  0.0007207 0.0000453 0.0001018 
*=.05  **=.01 
Table 6 shows the relationships between the delinquency finding contact point (the point 
at which a youth receives an adjudication of “delinquent”) and the race/ethnicity population 
variables. For this contact point, the statistically significant relationships occur between the 
percent Black population with the Black and Latino/a rates of delinquency findings. The 
coefficient for the relationship between the percent Black population and the rate of Black youth 
delinquency findings is -.0007085, indicating for every percent Black increase in the population 
the rate of Black delinquency findings decreases by .0007085. When the right to counsel variable 
is added, the coefficient changes to -.0007194. When the waiver of counsel variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0007223. When the indigency determination variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0007011. When the post-dispositional advocacy variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.000732. When the total due process variable is added, the coefficient 
changes to -.0007838. 
Table 6: Delinquency Contact Point 
 White Del. Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  -0.0032286 0.001707 -0.0001058 -0.0000398 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel -0.0032707 0.0015305 0.0001082 0.0001426 
Waiver of Counsel -0.0033034 0.0018846 -0.0000984 -0.0000147 
Indigency Det -0.0034374 0.0017103 -0.0000908 -0.0000353 
Post-Dispo Advocacy -0.0033565 0.0019896 -0.0000853 -6.19E-06 
Total Due Process  -0.0033565 0.0018956 0.000044 0.0001444 
 Black Del. Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model *-.0007085  0.0001952 0.0000243 0.0000478 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel *-.0007194  0.0001665 0.000051 0.000071 
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Waiver of Counsel *-.0007223 0.0002224 0.0000248 0.0000501 
Indigency Det *-.0007011 0.000202 0.0000233 0.0000475 
Post-Dispo Advocacy * -.000732 0.0002351 0.0000272 0.0000523 
Total Due Process  **-.0007838  0.0002189 0.0000383 0.0000651 
 Latino/a Del. Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  *-.0016465  0.0009001 -0.0000332 0.000013 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel *-.0016438 0.0008501 0.0000136 0.0000545 
Waiver of Counsel *-.0016767 0.0009633 -0.0000315 0.0000191 
Indigency Det *-.0016367 0.0009013 -0.0000313 0.0000131 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0017987  0.0010314 -0.0000216 0.0000307 
Total Due Process  ** -.001802 0.0009846 7.70E-06 0.0000629 
*=.05  **=.01 
The relationship between the percent Black in the population and the Latino/a 
delinquency findings rate produces a coefficient of -.0016465. This baseline model shows that 
every percent increase in Black population results in a .0016465 decrease in the delinquency 
finding rate for Latino/a youth per 100,000 people.  When the right to counsel variable is added, 
the coefficient changes to -.0016438. When the waiver of counsel variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0016767. When the indigency determination variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0016367. When the post-dispositional advocacy variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0017987. When the total due process variable is added, the coefficient 
changes to -.001802.  
No statistically significant relationships exist between the confinement contact point and 
any of the race/ethnicity population variables. Table 7 presents the coefficients without a 
statistically significant relationship.  
Table 7: Confinement Contact Point 
 White Confinement Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model -0.0128529 0.0099584 -0.0016075 -0.0011622 
Due Process Mediators 
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Right to Counsel -0.0129763 0.0086677 -0.0009647 -0.0006245 
Waiver of Counsel -0.013471 0.0102169 -0.0016584 -0.0012169 
Indigency Det -0.0127413 0.0119331 -0.0020212 -0.0014029 
Post-Dispo Advocacy -0.0132582 0.0104615 -0.0015084 -0.0010333 
Total Due Process  -0.0128932 0.0101371 -0.001645 -0.0011612 
 Black Confinement Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  -0.0018814 0.0015258 -0.0003733 -0.000298 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel -0.0018603 0.0013956 -0.0002596 -0.0181966 
Waiver of Counsel -0.0019117 0.0015482 -0.0003811 -0.0174286 
Indigency Det -0.0019257 0.00179 -0.0004222 -0.0197684 
Post-Dispo Advocacy -0.0019079 0.0015711 -0.0003655 -0.0174153 
Total Due Process  -0.0019125 0.0015437 -0.0003677 -0.017348 
 Latino/a Confinement Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model  -0.0040323 0.0036184 -0.0009596 -0.0007914 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel -0.0039996 0.0033045 -0.0006963 -0.0005784 
Waiver of Counsel -0.004068 0.003696 -0.0009749 -0.0008133 
Indigency Det -0.0040765 0.0039954 -0.0010658 -0.0008633 
Post-Dispo Advocacy -0.0043151 0.0038523 -0.0009278 -0.0007472 
Total Due Process  -0.0042631 0.0037443 -0.000902 -0.0007228 
*=.05  **=.01 
Table 8 illustrates the statistically significant relationships between the youth probation 
rate and the racial/ethnic composition of states. The only two baseline models with statistically 
significant associations are the Black probation rate and the Latino/a probation rate, both with 
the percent Black population. The coefficient representing the relationship between the Black 
probation rate and the percent Black population is -.0012607, indicating with every percent 
increase in the Black population the Black probation rate decreases by .0012607. When the right 
to counsel variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0012856. When the waiver of counsel 
variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0012592. When the indigency determination 
variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0036807. When the post-dispositional advocacy 
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variable is added, the coefficient changes to -.0011857. When the total due process variable is 
added, the coefficient changes to -.0012744. 
Table 8: Probation Contact Point 
 White Probation Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model 0.0003981 0.0003981 0.0005957 0.0008717 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel -0.0055922 -0.0000204 0.001048 0.0012576 
Waiver of Counsel -0.0052473 0.0003314 0.00059 0.0008357 
Indigency Det *-.0064004  0.0004028 0.0006611 0.0009156 
Post-Dispo Advocacy -0.004565 0.000253 0.0005687 0.0008369 
Total Due Process  *-.005531 0.000419 0.0005896 0.0008543 
 Black Probation Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model **-.0012607  0.0001111 0.0001122 0.0001665 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.0012856 0.0000484 0.0001639 0.0002163 
Waiver of Counsel ** -.0012592  0.0001173 0.0001117 0.0001615 
Indigency Det **-.0012522  0.0001124 0.0001118 0.0001665 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0011857  0.0001111 0.0001083 0.0001617 
Total Due Process  **-.0012744  0.0001196 0.000102 0.0001569 
 Latino/a Probation Rate    
 PCTB PCTH PCTW Diversity 
Baseline Model **-.0036876  0.0013915 0.0001541 0.0003151 
Due Process Mediators 
Right to Counsel **-.0036934 0.0013023 0.0002672 0.0004141 
Waiver of Counsel ** -.0036925  0.0014291 0.0001481 0.0003003 
Indigency Det **-.0036807   0.0014061 0.0001672 0.0003216 
Post-Dispo Advocacy **-.0035117  0.0014054 0.0001408 0.0002992 
Total Due Process  **-.0037072 0.00144 0.0001479 0.0003118 
*=.05  **=.01 
The relationship between the percent Black population and the Latino/a probation rate 
produces a statistically significant coefficient of -.0036876. When the right to counsel variable is 
added, the coefficient changes to -.0036934. When the waiver of counsel variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0036925. When the indigency determination variable is added, the 
coefficient changes to -.0036807. When the post-dispositional advocacy variable is added, the 
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coefficient changes to -.0011857. When the total due process variable is added, the coefficient 






Overall, the predominant finding from the analyses presents a significant relationship 
between the percent Black population in a state and the rates of contact with the juvenile justice 
system for youth. The percent Black population maintains a statistically significant relationship 
for the rate of contact among White, Black, and Latino/a youth at multiple contact points across 
the system. The percent Hispanic population only has a statistically significant relationship with 
the arrest rate for White and Latino youth, while the percent White population, racial/ethnic 
diversity index, and all socioeconomic status measures do not have statistically significant 
relationships with juvenile justice system contact rates. When the due process protections factor 
into the models as potential mediating variables, the findings indicate many of the due process 
protections decrease the rates of contact, across all three race/ethnicities – White, Black, and 
Latino/a. In a few instances, the introduction of due process mediating factors increases the rate 
of contact between youth and the juvenile justice system.  
 
Racial/Ethnic Population Demographics and Rates of Contact 
 
 The findings indicating the prevalent relationships between the population racial/ethnic 
demographics and contact rates with the juvenile justice system illustrate the impact of larger 
populations of Black people in a state on the administration of justice for youth; but also, the 
relationships serve as a comparison point for understanding the role of defense counsel in 
decreasing rates of youth contact with the juvenile justice system. The percent Black of a state 
population has a statistically significant relationship on the contact rates of all three racial/ethnic 
groups examined in this project: White, Black, and Latino. The percent Black has the most 
frequent association with the contact rates of Latino/a youth. The percent Black of a state 
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population decreases the Latino/a contact rates at five contact points: detention, diversion, 
petition, delinquency finding, and probation, while increasing the contact rate for Latino youth at 
arrest. Similarly, the percent Black has an association with the rates of Black youth contact with 
the juvenile justice system, decreasing contact at all five significant contact points: arrest, 
detention, diversion, delinquency finding, and probation. With less frequency, the percent Black 
of a state population has an association with White youth contact, decreasing the contact rates at 
arrest, detention, and diversion. The percent Hispanic of the state population has an association 
with only the White and Latino arrest rates.  Table 9 depicts these associations. The findings 
show the stand-out relationship between the percentage of the Black population and the contact 
rates of Black and Latino youth throughout the juvenile justice system process.  
Table 9: Impact of State Racial/Ethnic Composition 
Population Demographic DMC Demographic JJ System Contact Point 
Directional 





















Percent Hispanic White 
Arrest + 
Latino Arrest + 
Percent White All None N/A 
Diversity Index All None N/A 
 
 
Defense Counsel Policies as Mediators 
 
State policies on defense counsel predominately have a partially mediating role between 
the state racial/ethnic population demographics and the differences in contact rates with the 
juvenile justice system. Regarding the statistically significant relationships identified between 
the state population demographics and contact rates, the defense counsel policies most frequently 
(although not always) decrease the rate of contact of youth with the juvenile justice system.  The 
percent Black and percent Hispanic maintain the only statistically significant relationships upon 
the introduction of due process protections. The relationship between the percent Hispanic and 
contact rates with the juvenile justice system only remain significant at the arrest point of contact 
for White and Latino/a youth. This is a curious association because the protections of defense 
counsel most often apply later in the juvenile justice process. This may indicate an indirect 
impact of having greater or earlier defense counsel protections throughout the duration of the 
justice process.  When defense counsel policies provider higher levels of due process protections, 
these arrest rates increase for White and Latino youth. These are the only relationships outside 
the percent Black that maintain statistical significance, so the remainder of the discussion focuses 
on the partial mediation of the defense counsel policies on the relationship between the percent 
Black and the contact points for Black, Latino, and White youth throughout the juvenile justice 
















































White Arrest - - + - Fully 
Mediates 
+ 
Detention - - - - + - 
Diversion - - - - - - 
Black Arrest - + - + + + 
Detention - + + - + + 
Diversion - - - - - - 
Delinq. 
Finding 
- - - + - - 
Probation - - + + - - 
Latino Arrest + - - - - - 
Detention - + - - + + 
Diversion - + - - - - 
Petition - + - + - - 
Delinq. 
Finding 
- + - + - - 
Probation - - - + + - 
Percent 
Hispanic 
White Arrest + + - + - - 
Latino Arrest + - - + - - 
 
The percent Black population has an association with the rates of White, Black, and 
Latino/a youth contact with the juvenile justice system, as noted above. These relationships are 
partially mediated (and fully mediated in one instance) by five types of defense counsel policies: 
right to counsel, waiver of counsel, indigency determination, post-dispositional representation, 
and the total due process provided by the categories identified in this project.  
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The state policies on right to counsel partially mediate the impact of the percent Black 
population in a state. As the percent Black rises, the rates of White youth contact with the system 
at arrest, detention, and diversion decrease. Increasing the protections of right to counsel policies 
further decreases at all three of the contact points for White youth. The impact of protective 
defense counsel policies expands for Black youth. The increase in protective right to counsel 
policies associate with a decrease in Black youth contact at diversion, delinquency findings, and 
probation; however, these policies correlate with increases in the rates at arrest and detention. 
This may reflect the role of the courts, through which defense counsel provisions have the 
greatest protections for clients. Arrest and detention decisions often reflect the decision and 
information-gathering of police, whereas diversion, delinquency findings, and probation include 
defense counsel and prosecutor. A similar pattern emerges for Latino/a youth; right to counsel 
protections decrease initial rates of contact at the detention, diversion, petition, delinquency, and 
probation contact points in the system, while contact rates increase at arrest. Despite the 
increases early in the system process, the policies for right to counsel most frequently partially 
mediate the contact rates associated with the percent Black in the population by further 
decreasing the contact rates farther into the system.  
Waiver of counsel partially mediates the demographic impact by further decreasing the 
rate of contact for White, Black, and Latino/a youth at multiple contact points. In comparison to 
the initial association between percent Black and rates of contact, the policies providing 
protections for youth involving waiver of counsel decrease for White youth at the detention and 
diversion points; Black youth at the arrest, diversion, and delinquency points; and at detention, 
diversion, petition, delinquency findings, and probation points for Latino/a youth. Waiver of 
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counsel protections partially mediate rates of contact by increasing White arrest rates, Black 
detention rates, and Black probation rates.  
Indigency determinations that have greater protections from state policies decrease the 
contact rates established by the initial association between percent Black in a population and the 
White youth in the juvenile justice system. The partial mediation by the indigency determination 
policies decreases the rates of White contact at arrest, detention, and diversion points. The 
mediation does not increase the rates at any point. For Black youth, indigency determination 
policy protections decrease rates from the initial association at detention and diversion points, 
but increases the rates at arrest, delinquency, and probation points. The findings for Latino/a 
youth follows the same pattern; the protections for indigency determinations decrease rates at 
arrest, detention, and diversion, but increase rates at petition, delinquency, and probation.  
Protections in state policies for post-disposition representation offer the only fully 
mediating relationship with contact points in the juvenile justice system. The White arrest rate is 
fully mediated with stronger protections for post-dispositional advocacy. Interestingly, this 
finding connects protection farther in the juvenile justice system process (i.e., protections while 
under correctional supervision, post-court-processing) with the early contact point of arrest. The 
additional mediations consist of partial mediation. For White youth, the post-disposition 
protections also decrease diversion rates but increase probation rates. The protective policies for 
post-dispositional advocacy decrease the arrest and detention rates, but increase the diversion, 
delinquency, and probation findings, for Black youth. For Latino youth, post-dispositional 
advocacy protections decrease arrest, diversion, petition, and delinquency finding rates, in 
addition to increasing detention and probation rates.  
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The “total due process” protections sum the protections for access to defense counsel 
provided by the other categories. This overall measure offers a single large-scope capture of the 
protections for access to defense counsel in state policies. The total due process protections in 
state policies partially mediate the White, Black, and Latino/a contact rates with the juvenile 
justice system. The White youth arrest rate increases, but the rates of detention and diversion 
decrease. The Black arrest and detention rates increase, while the rates of diversion, delinquency, 
and probation decreased. For Latino youth, the detention rate increases, but the arrest, diversion, 
petition, delinquency, and probation rates decrease.  
Overall, the protections for waiver have the greatest association with decreasing contact 
with the juvenile justice system for White, Black, and Latino/a youth and “total due process” 
offers the second. The waiver to counsel policies provide a second layer of protection of the right 
to defense counsel after the provision of counsel, by reducing the likelihood youth will 
unintentionally or unintelligently waive counsel. The stronger protections for waiver of counsel 
may associate with greater access to counsel, which then decrease the continued contact with the 
justice system for youth. This could have an impact on the percentage of Black and Latino youth 
who face disparate probabilities of contact with the juvenile justice system by providing them 
with an advocate to counter systemic biases against the youth as they move through the system. 
The total due process protections have the second strongest association with decreasing contact 
with the system. This likely relates to the totality of the variable in summing the protections into 
a single measure, encompassing the widest range of protections throughout the entire system’s 
process.  
The policies surrounding the indigency determination have the weakest impact on 
decreasing the contact rates. This may reflect the indigency process as a gateway to receiving 
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counsel but also the least impactful in relation to legal protections from counsel once appointed. 
The indigency process does not impact the duration or responsibilities of defense counsel; it only 
allows for the appointment of counsel at the typical time of appointment for each state. The 
indigency process lacks the variation across states also, which may limit it impact across state 
contact rates. The financial determination may align more closely with socioeconomic factors, 
which contained no statistical significance in the relationship examined in this dissertation.  
The contact point of diversion, in the data set defined as when youth are “sent to a facility 
in lieu of adjudication as part of a diversion agreement” (Haywood Burns Institute), shows the 
most consistent decreases across all races/ethnicities when due process protections increase.  
This may reflect the lack of representation by defense counsel at the point when youth take a 
plea deal that diverts them from the court system (although it places them in the corrections 
system), and the availability of counsel may encourage youth to go through the adjudication 
process. The consistent decreases could also represent the small percent of youth who qualify as 
“diverted” in the data set; the data captures the youth who enter into juvenile facilities without 
delinquent adjudications, which comprises a very small proportion of youth in the facilities, and 
likely who divert out of the justice system all together (Haywood Burns Institute). 
Overall, a few consistent patterns emerge from the data. Most predominately, the percent 
Black has the strongest associations with the rates of contact with the juvenile justice system for 
all three racial/ethnic groups – White, Black, and Latino/a. Beyond arrest rates, it is the only 
racial/ethnic indicator to impact contact rates across the juvenile justice system, including 
detention, diversion, petition, delinquency findings, and probation. The state policy protections 
for defense counsel have a mediating role for the relationships that already exist between the 
population demographics and the contact rate demographics. The defense counsel protections 
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that most consistently mediate to decrease the relationship between the population demographics 
and contact rate demographics are “total due process” and waiver of counsel. The contact point 
that most consistently has a mediated relationship with population demographics through defense 
counsel protections is diversion for White, Black, and Latino youth.  
 
Policy Implications 
 The policy implications for this study must also take into consideration the identified 
limitations discussed below; however, the patterns emerging from the analysis direct a few 
policy implications. The primary findings in this study align with prior research on 
disproportionate minority contact in the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal justice 
system. The percent Black of a population has the most consistent and numerous associations 
with contact with the juvenile justice system. This includes the contact Black, White, and Latino 
youth have with the juvenile justice system; however, most predominately, the percent Black in a 
population impacts the contact of Black and Latino/a youth in the juvenile justice system. This 
finding supports the findings of other disproportionate minority contact studies and data analysis 
on the juvenile justice system in which Black youth have the greatest disparate contact rate in 
comparison to all other racial/ethnic groups.  
The federal government recognizes the ongoing disparate contact of Black youth with the 
juvenile justice system and maintains the continued study of Disproportionate Minority Contact 
as a core component of the primary piece of federal legislation: The Juvenile Justice 
Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA). The JJDPA core component addressing this issue does not 
contain strong requirements for states to identify or address racially disparate contacts in each 
state. Stronger federal requirements may encourage states to investigate disparity with the 
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juvenile justice system. The findings from this study add to the evidence that disparities in the 
juvenile justice system extend beyond a single contact point and have a complex relationship to 
the larger population demographics within which the system operates. A stronger mandate in the 
Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act for the identification and study of racial/ethnic 
disparities in states would help to address the disparity and reasons for the disparity. 
Of note, the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act initially introduced the “DMC” 
core component when the acronym stood for disproportionate minority confinement (Office of 
Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention). The acronym then expanded to stand for 
disproportionate minority contact, acknowledging that the disparity exists at all contact points. In 
this study, confinement stood out as the only contact point without any significant associations to 
state population demographics. The qualitative analysis found states with limited defense counsel 
protections provide, at the very least, representation at adjudication when the disposition may be 
confinement. Highlighting confinement as a point of contact worthy of receiving additional 
attention – both during the court process for individual youth and systemically by the federal 
government – may contribute to the lack of statistically significant findings in this study. If true, 
this further encourages the expansion of federal support for identifying and addressing disparity 
at all contact points and the protection of access to defense counsel in state policies.   
Currently, not a lot of research exists regarding defense counsel in delinquency courts. Of 
the current body of research, most identify variation in the harshness of dispositions as the 
primary impact of defense counsel. In juvenile court, defense counsel serves to uphold the due 
process rights of youth. In this role, defense counsel advocacy may have a larger impact on the 
functioning of the juvenile justice system. The findings in this study indicate differences in the 
rates of contact of youth with the juvenile justice system in relation to improved protections for 
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defense counsel. More specifically, in more instances than not, defense counsel decreases the 
rate of system contact for Black and Latino/a youth – the same youth who experience disparate 
contact with the system.  
The findings in this study support the expansion of state policies that protect the role of 
defense counsel as an adversarial advocate for youth in juvenile delinquency court. The 
introduction of policies protecting defense counsel have an association with decreased rates of 
contact across the juvenile justice system in a manner that predominately further reduces contact 
for Black and Latino/a youth beyond reductions associated with state racial/ethnic demographics. 
Further, these findings identify additional outcomes of defense counsel in juvenile delinquency 
court beyond meeting constitutional rights of youth. While the primary role of defense counsel 
continues to be upholding youth rights, evaluations of defense counsel policies can encompass 
broader outcomes than the current research contains, including the impact on disparate rates of 
contact for minority youth in the juvenile justice system.  
 
Limitations 
 As an exploratory study, the methodology, and consequently the findings, contain many 
limitations. The arduous work of qualitative data collection for the state statutes, case law, and 
court rules consists of looking into the policies of each state and tracing the laws through various 
sections of code, rules, and case law decisions. This process subjects itself to human error despite 
best efforts to encompass all policies related to the provision of defense counsel in juvenile 
delinquency court. Similar human error may be found in the original collection of the 
quantitative data measuring contact with the juvenile justice system. The disproportionate 
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minority contact data is limited in scope and may contain errors in counts, definitions of 
procedural points, and identification of races/ethnicities.    
 The study relies on the limited data available. The N for the quantitative portion of the 
study is 34 because only 34 states report enough DMC data to comprise a state-level analysis. 
Further, this study only looks at relationships within a single-year timeframe. The available 
DMC data and juvenile defense policy data dictated 2013 as the most recent year of data 
available for both the DMC and defense policies. To expand this timeframe into past years would 
have necessitated entirely new data collection for the qualitative state policies, and, depending on 
the year, a reduction in the N due to fewer states reporting DMC data. The states reporting DMC 
data may self-select based on systematic differences among states in a manner that directly 
impacts the analysis of this study. The study presents an exploratory study on the relationships 
among state populations, state policies, and disparate outcomes for youth in the juvenile justice 
system. Further research with, at the very least, additional states and years of data would reduce 
the limitations of this study. 
 
Future Research 
Future research may extend this exploratory study in many directions. Expanding the data 
collection into future years for juvenile defense policies and racial/ethnic contact with the justice 
system would allow for a more thorough analysis and the opportunity to measure change over 
time. These potential studies, as well as the current one, would also benefit from racial/ethnic 
contact data from additional states.  Additional data on racial/ethnic contacts may also allow for 
a hierarchical analysis, inquiring into the relationship between county-level racial/ethnic, 
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socioeconomic status, and racial/ethnic contact rates with the state-level defense counsel 
policies.  
The qualitative analysis of the defense counsel policies resulted in five variables for 
analysis in this study; however, each variable contained multiple coded policy components to 
create the final variable code. For example, the waiver of counsel contained a standard for 
informed waiver, waiver of counsel in writing, and a court hearing on the waiver, among other 
components. Future research may look into each of the components to see if a specific one has an 
association with the racial/ethnic contact rates at different points within the juvenile justice 
system.  
The current study also directs two specific lines of inquiry resulting from the findings. A 
slight division appears in the findings between the impact of defense counsel policies on contact 
points prior to a court petition and contact points after a court petition. The timing of defense 
counsel appointment differs across states, frequently after petition. A further inquiry into the 
impact of defense counsel based on timing of appointment that divides findings into before- and 
after-appointment merits analysis.  
The findings in this study also show a large impact on diversion. In juvenile justice 
policy, diversion often refers to the multiple pathways out of the juvenile justice system entirely 
without sending youth to facility lock-ups. This study relies on the OJJDP diversion contact 
point as defined by NCJRS, which encompasses only youth who “divert” out of the system into a 
secure facility. Information on the youth who who divert out of the system entirely pre-
adjudication, without going to a secure facility, would increase the knowledge on the impact of 
defense counsel, the racial/ethnic rates of contact with the system, and the disparity of contact.   
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Diversion decisions often reside with the prosecutor or the intake personnel, often a 
probation officer. Frequently separate policies govern diversion policies apart from decisions 
made by prosecutors, judges, probation officers, and youth defendants. A similar analysis could 
determine the impact of diversion policies on racial/ethnic rates of contact with the juvenile 
justice system and their relationship with defense counsel policies. This would entail a 
qualitative analysis of the diversion policies and would provide additional information on the 
diversion of youth out of the juvenile justice system.  
Further, an underlying assumption in this study that the state policies align with the 
practices implemented by courts, prosecutor offices, and defense attorneys requires more 
investigation. Although this study favors explicit language in the policies protecting juvenile 
defense counsel for youth, these polices rely on local practitioners to adhere to them and still 
leave some room for localized interpretation or implementation. A qualitative study to determine 
the gaps between the policy as written and the experiences of those involved in the juvenile 
justice system – youth, practitioners, and families – would provide more insight into the nexus 
between state policies and racially/ethnically disparate outcomes. 
As an exploratory study and one of the few studies transforming qualitative data on state 
policies into quantitative data for analysis, this study serves as a starting point for future research 
into foundational inquiries on the administration of juvenile justice. Research in the areas of 
defense counsel in juvenile court, disproportionate minority contact in the juvenile justice 
system, and the protections of civil liberties amid state interests and power contribute to a more 









Right to Counsel   
Timing of Appointment   
**Arrest/Intake (4) 1 
** Pre-petition (detention) (3) 1 
** Petition (detention) (2) 1 
** Petition (trial) (adjudication) (1) 1 
Express Procedural Representation Points (not including postadjudication) 1 
Informed of Right to Counsel 1 
Status and Delinquency Proceedings 1 
Role of Counsel 1 
Opportunity to Confer with Counsel 1 
Court shall/must (rather than may) appoint & court discretion;  1 
Continuance if no representation 1 
Interrogation representation 1 
Limitation to delinq. representation based on confinement -2 
Conflict of interest with parents 1 
Addresses GAL confusion 1 
If counsel is GAL, then 0 points for everything 0 
    
Waiver of Counsel   
Silent statute/rule/caselaw or reference to adult waiver means no points at all 0 
Parents able to waive = no points at all 0 
No right to waive (so always have counsel) receives 4 points but none of the ones below  4 
Partial non-waiver (i.e., limitation to waiver through explicit prohibitory language) = 2 
points and points below   
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Youth read/informed of rights required (must) 1 
Read rights and/or waived rights in presence of counsel (if point here, point above also) 1 
Informed of rights (through appointment of counsel or reading of right) *at detention 
hearing* 1 
Youth consulted with counsel (not parent or GAL) 1 
Counsel investigated facts 1 
Youth waives knowingly  1 
Youth waives with understanding  1 
Youth waives intelligently/comptently 1 
Youth waives voluntarily 1 
Youth informed of the charges, possible dispositions, possible defenses, knows 
consequences of charges, consequences of no representation, collateral consequences of 
adjudication  (any of these) 1 
Youth expressly waives right to counsel  1 
Waiver in writing /signed/on the record  1 
Parent, guardian, adult, et al. not allowed to waive right 1 
Court verifies waiver made knowingly and voluntarily  1 
Court holds hearing on waiver  1 
Youth informed of right at other stages of proceeding, even if waived earlier 1 
Standby counsel appointed for youth to assist at court 1 
    
Post Adjudication Representation   
Motions/Motion preparation 1 
Post-disposition hearings 1 
Review of dispositional order 1 
Modify disposition order (including change to placement) 1 
Modify custody orders  1 
Modify probation orders 1 
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Probation revocation 1 
Probation violation 1 
On parole/probation   
Seeking parole 1 
Parole revocation  1 
Parole modification 1 
Conditions of Confinement/Placement   
Recommitment 1 
Extension of placement/jurisdiction 1 
Hearing on aftercare revocation 1 
Transfer hearing (waiver of jurisdiction to adult court) 1 
Appeals of final order 1 
Appeal 1 
All proceedings -- not specific to post-disposition = no points at all for entire section, if 
nothing else stated   
30 days post disposition if motion filed = no points at all for entire section   
ONLY stating appointment continues until court's jurisdiction terminates = no points at all 
for entire section   
ONLY stating Any proceeding deemed appropriate = no points at all for entire section   
Limitations to above based on financial means or residential/detention placement = one 
point only for entire section   
All subsequent court hearings in the proceedings = only one point for entire section   
Any/All post-adjudication or review proceeding = 5 points for entire section   
    
Determination of Indigence   
Presumption of indigence  2 
 Youth assets considered only 1 
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 Indigency (including finding process) doesn’t block/delay representation 1 
Fee applied to indigency determination -1 






Quantitative Analysis for Socioeconomic Variables 
Contact Point Race/Ethnicity 100% Poverty Unemployment Bach Educ 
Arrest 
White  4.96E-06 -0.0002256 -0.0000999 
Black  -7.16E-07 -4.27E-06 -2.75E-06 
Latino/a  -0.0000169 -0.0000689 -0.0000585 
Detention 
White  -0.0006253 9.90E-06 -0.0006887 
Black  -0.0000861 -0.0000937 -0.0000525 
Latino/a  -0.000178 -0.0001692 -0.0001448 
Diversion 
White  -0.0000514 -2.75E-04 -0.0005036 
Black  -0.0000131 -0.0000669 -0.0000666 
Latino/a  -0.0000189 -0.0000917 -0.0001663 
Petition 
White  -0.0000444 0.0000337 -0.0001134 
Black  -9.29E-06 -0.0000211 0.0000134 
Latino/a  -0.0000271 -0.0000533 0.0000166 
Delinquency Finding 
White  -0.000099 -0.0000522 -0.0002773 
Black  -0.0000112 -0.0000372 -0.000015 
Latino/a  -0.0000269 -0.0000522 -0.0000406 
Confinement 
White  -0.0019923 0.0022509 -0.000176 
Black  0.0012148 0.0125504 -0.0007163 
Latino/a  -0.0003473 0.0005775 0.0002076 
Probation 
White  -0.0002685 -0.0000609 -0.0007395 
Black  -0.0000327 -0.0000396 -0.0000699 
Latino/a  -0.0001396 -0.0001253 -0.0001947 
          
  *=.05      
  **=.01      
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